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FOREWORD  
 
This major research paper related to my plan of study in many respects: In general I 
have developed an understanding of the science of climate change, and have learned 
about policies and strategies that exist to address climate change mitigation. An analysis 
of Germany’s climate change policy particularly has provided me with a deeper 
understanding of renewable energy policies in relation to achieving targets set out by 
climate change policies. In addition to this, this paper has contributed to my 
understanding of the role each level of government has to play in issues about the 
environment in Canada, in particular writing this paper has provided me with a deep 
understanding of the role that the federal government has to play in climate policy versus 
the role of the provinces. I have also developed a deeper understanding of the policy 
process through analyzing how Canada and Germany have both approached climate 
policy agenda setting and formulation. Overall, the research and writing that went into 
developing this paper meet the expectations set out in my plan of study.  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Climate change is an important issue. This paper will look at the climate change policy of 
Canada and Germany. In particular borrowing from Hessing et al.'s analysis of resource 
and environment policy by way of looking at the dynamics of policy networks, I will 
compare the climate change policy of Canada and Germany. Policy network analysis 
looks at the intersections of state and societal actors, and helps us to understand why 
we might see significant policy change and progression on the one hand or no change 
and only incremental progress on the other. Canada has gained a reputation for being a 
laggard when it comes to its national climate policy, whereas Germany has been praised 
for its more progressive approach and ambitious commitments to climate change policy. 
Using a framework inspired by Dr. Mark Winfield, in combination with policy network 
analysis, this paper will analyze Canada and Germany’s climate policy through an 
analysis of their institutional frameworks, political economic context, societal forces, and 
the ideas and discourses around the matter. The aim of this paper is to provide an 
analysis of the key problem areas for Canada’s climate change policy, through a 
comparison of Germany’s more progressive action on climate policy. 
 
In chapter one I will introduce the importance of climate change policy. In chapter two I 
provide an explanation of the significance of climate change and the science behind it. In 
chapter three I look at climate policy in Canada through an intuitional, political economic, 
societal and ideational framework in the context of policy networks and argue that 
jurisdictional ambiguity and the strong relationships between the state and economic 
interests have placed a significant barrier on moving forward on climate change. In 
chapter four, I apply this same framework to the German context and argue that the 
close ties between non-economic actors such as environmental groups and state 
officials, along with the overall general agreement within the climate policy community 
that action on climate change is required, has helped to foster a progressive climate 
change policy in the country. In chapter five I tie my arguments for each country together 
to highlight the key differences in the interactions of institutions, economic interests, 
societal actors, and the general ideas about climate change. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The importance of a national climate change policy  
 The problem of climate change is important and worth researching because 
climate change is increasingly becoming known as one of the greatest challenges of our 
time. It is an issue that extends beyond national borders, which adds to the complexity of 
coordinating a sound climate change policy and moving forward. Given the global 
context of this problem, working together internationally is important in order to set global 
targets that nations can work towards. However, every country is unique with their own 
individual challenges, so it is important that individual countries work towards national 
climate change policies in order to meet agreed upon global targets.  
 In light of the past United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Conferences, climate change policy in Canada has made very little progress, and a lot of 
the time, the issue has been largely disregarded, especially in the past decade under the 
conservative government of Stephen Harper. Canada has done poorly on environmental 
performance compared to OECD countries, particularly in terms of climate change and 
energy efficiency. This has mainly been due to Canada’s resource-intensive economy. 
For a long-time, environmental policy in Canada has been a debate over the economy 
vs. the environment, with the belief that you can either have a developed economy or a 
clean environment, but not both. This is not the case however, and many countries have 
been able to achieve sustainable development, protecting the environment without 
hurting the economy.  
 Coordinating a national climate change policy is a common challenge amongst 
all nations, but it is especially challenging amongst federated systems that combine self-
rule with shared rule. Federations must balance divergent and shared interests, and 
often face collective action dilemmas as problematic as those that operate between 
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states. Through a comparison of two federated states: Canada and Germany, I wish to 
examine why Canada has lagged while Germany has largely been a leader on the 
climate policy front. Through a comparative policy network analysis of both countries, I 
wish to seek how coordination between nation states can be attained and sustained. 
 The remainder of this paper will begin by explaining the significance of climate 
change and the science behind it. It will then go on to provide an analysis of both 
Canadian and German climate change policy, through an analytical framework which 
includes four key factors in policy network analysis: institutional framework, political 
economic context, societal forces, and ideas and discourses. This framework is used 
because policy decisions and policy changes are usually a product of the interaction of 
these four key areas. It is important to consider the institutional context of a country’s 
political structure within which governments operate, in order to understand why/how 
certain decisions get made. Taking a look at climate change policy through the lens of 
the political economic context, will help us to understand action on climate change 
policy, by the way in which multiple and often conflicting interests are affected and 
impacted differently by economic transactions, recognizing that actors are differentially 
situated with respect to the costs and benefits of those exchanges. Societal forces such 
as interest groups and non-state actors, the media, and public opinion, usually help to 
shape the discourses around climate change in a country, therefore it would be 
beneficial to look at how societal forces are shaping climate change policy. Lastly, an 
analysis of the ideas in a nation and its leader can have a significant impact on climate 
change. For example, is the issue viewed in terms of climate vs. the economy, or can we 
address both together? Questions like this will have significant implications for policy. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the key problem areas for Canada’s 
climate change policy, through a comparison of Germany’s more progressive action on 
climate policy.  
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Policy Analysis and the Policy Network  
 This paper draws heavily from the work of Hessing, Howlett, and Summerville 
(2005) and their contribution to Canadian natural resource and environmental policy; 
more specifically their emphasis on the importance of policy networks in relation to policy 
analysis. A crucial component of policy analysis involves investigating policy actors and 
their interests. This section of the paper will examine the framework for environmental 
policy analysis used by Hessing et al. (2005): the policy cycle model in combination with 
network policy analysis. Environmental policy in Canada has been heavily influenced by 
a strong resource sector and as a result has been affected by the jurisdictional 
capacities in the country. Before exploring Hessing, Howlett, and Summerville’s work, a 
brief exploration into environmental policy in general, from a traditional perspective to the 
current situation will take place below.  
 In Canada jurisdictional complexity has complicated environmental policy making 
in a federal system. There is no explicit reference made to environment in the 
constitution and therefore, national and provincial governments have interpreted the 
division of powers. The federal government uses the peace, order and good government 
as a basis to act, and the provincial governments use the ownership of resources, civil 
law, property, and civil rights outlined by the constitution (Skogstad and Kopas, 1993; 
Doern and Conway, 2008). This creates jurisdictional ambiguity over environmental 
matters between the federal and provincial governments. Traditionally, this has led to 
federal guidelines and provincial enforcement, particularly since provinces have close 
ties with economic actors; they are reluctant to enforce coercive regulation, which 
explains why the federal government only provides guidelines.  
As environmental issues began to rise in the early 1970s, economic actors 
played a powerful role in policy-making, as they had close ties to provincial 
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governments. Since Canada’s history has traditionally been organized around resource 
exploitation, there has been a very close association between government and business. 
Both the federal and the provincial governments held a bias towards economic 
development activities and as such, often times were in agreement with industry 
representatives. This resulted in weak regulations on industry. Over the years however, 
environmental policy making has become more open, to include actors beyond just 
industry and government officials, such as the general public and environmental groups. 
After 1990 the role of the public started to become more prominent because the threat of 
more severe environmental problems began to increase, a loss of faith in government to 
act due to their close relations with economic interests, and with the help of the court 
system (Skogstad and Kopas, 1993).  
Court decisions in the early 90s resulted in the creation of a greater role for 
federal-level governance under areas that were considered to be exclusively under 
provincial jurisdiction. For example, in natural resource development that impacted areas 
of federal jurisdiction, and for which the federal government contributed towards 
financially, are subject to a federal environmental impact assessments. In the presence 
of such court rulings, and with the passage of the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act (CEPA) in 1988, the federal-provincial relationship became more tense, and the 
experience of intergovernmental conflict increased. Provincial governments strongly 
opposed court rulings that granted greater powers to federal government in fear that 
they would lose ownership and control over natural resources, and as a result economic 
development. As the environmental policy process began to open up, due the increase 
in public involvement and environmental groups, more scrutiny started to be placed on 
governments to act accordingly. This created what Stogstad and Kopas have referred to 
as ‘competitive federalism’ to the extent that the two levels of government (federal and 
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provincial) work towards obtaining public support by providing policies that the public 
would like to see (1993).  
In light of intergovernmental conflicts, the federal government has attempted to 
manage this conflict through co-operative federalism and federal self-restraint. 
Institutional mechanisms such as councils and committees provide a basis for 
cooperation among different levels of government. The Canadian Council of Ministers of 
the Environment (CCME) for example has played a crucial role in facilitating 
intergovernmental consultation and cooperation on environmental policy matters. In 
addition to this the federal government exercised a certain level of constraint in response 
to the provinces concerns that it was reaching too far into provincial jurisdiction. The 
federal government in this situation eases tensions with the provincial governments by 
ensuring that it would not act unilaterally, and also by reducing the scope of 
environmental assessments done at the federal level (Skogstad and Kopas, 1993). As a 
result, competitive federalism exists in combination with cooperative federalism. This has 
created complications with environmental policy making, as governments struggle to 
manage accountability to the public, and at the same time maintain cooperation between 
national and sub-national levels. The policy cycle can be used to help better understand 
these complexities within environmental policy-making. 
The policy cycle is heavily influenced by Harold Laswell’s model in which he 
isolated each state of the process for examination before putting the entire picture 
together (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). Laswell’s model informed later models which saw 
policy making as a process of applied problem solving. Hessing and Ramesh describe 
this process in 5 stages: “(1) recognition of a problem, (2) proposal of a solution to the 
problem, (3) choice of a solution, (4) putting the solution into effect, and (5) monitoring 
the effects of the solution upon the problem” (2003). Through this approach it is clear 
that the policy process is an ongoing cycle, and in parallel to this process is the policy 
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cycle which includes the following 5 stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, decision 
making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. A sequential cycle such as this 
one, in the analysis of environmental policy is beneficial since it reduces the complexities 
of public policy making, by dividing it up into stages and sub-stages. Each of these 
stages can be looked at alone or in relation to one another. This process also allows for 
an examination of all the actors and institutions involved with a policy, beyond just 
governmental agencies (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).  
 The policy cycle model has also been beneficial in identifying key characteristics 
of policy making at different stages of the process. This approach provides a common 
basis for comparison of the policy process and actors, therefore a basis for different 
sectors and different levels of government for example, to be examined in a similar 
manner. There are criticisms of the policy cycle model which argue that it is too 
systematic of an approach to problem solving, and that stages do not follow the logic of 
applied problem solving resembled in the policy cycle, instead, stages can be skipped or 
followed in varying orders (Hessing et al., 2005). Despite this, it is important to 
remember that the model is meant to be simple; it is not intended to capture all the 
complexities of public policy, but it does allow for policies to be reduced to analytical 
purposes to aid in investigating the complexities as they are uncovered. Therefore the 
policy cycle is useful to help us understand as Hessing et al. (2005) describe it: “the 
dynamic nature of public policy making and to organize the complex relations binding 
actors, institutions, and policy instruments.” A look at the policy process as a whole 
helps to uncover a pattern of policy development and change.  
 Generally studies reveal two typical patterns of policy change. One pattern 
reveals a relatively “normal” or a continuity of past policies, in other words there is limited 
policy change which can be attributed to having the same set of actors involved in the 
policy process over a long period of time (Hessing et al., 2005). This can be the result of 
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“policy monopolies” which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones argued are created by 
subsystems, “in which interpretation and approaches to problems are generally fixed” 
(Hessing et al., 2005). If these monopolies are broken by new members in the 
subsystem, policies can change. This brings us to the second pattern of policy change, 
which indeed involves a more substantial change and is usually referred to as a change 
in policy paradigms. Peter Hall establishes policy paradigms as “the broad goals begin 
policy, the related policy or puzzles that policy makers have to solve to get there, and, in 
large measure, the kind of instruments that can be used to attain these goals.” It can be 
referred to as a set of ideas within a policy subsystem; therefore a change in policy 
development can be linked to a change in the composition and membership of a 
subsystem. Shifts in material interests, different combinations of economic actors, 
changing economic relations and activities - all have a significant impact on how policies 
can change. Therefore a crucial part of policy analysis should begin by investigating 
policy actors and the intersection of their interests.  
 Policy subsystems as defined by Hessing et al. (2005) are “comprised of groups 
of actors bound together by some combination of material interests and policy ideas.” 
Democratic political subsystems are generally thought to be accountable to, and 
represent their citizens; this however, is not always the case. Ideally in environmental 
policy making, the public influenced elected representatives initiate government action, 
through lobbying, public education, and media campaigns. Public involvement however, 
faces barriers such as a lack of accountability of elected officials, the complexity of 
issues and problems to be solved, and access to financial and technical resources. It is 
more likely that the institutional and economic advantages seen by actors with financial 
interests overpower actors with non-financial interests. To more critically analyze these 
intersections, an analysis of policy subsystems should take place. Hessing et al. use two 
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components of subsystems to understand the interactions of actors in the policy 
process: 1) policy communities, and 2) policy networks.  
 Policy networks are connected by similar material interests, whereas in policy 
communities, this material and financial interest does not exist, but policy actors are 
connected by common policy knowledge. Hessing el al., (2005) describe the dynamic of 
the policy community and policy networks: “the policy network, represents a subset of 
the actors in the policy community that are connected by their interests and, more 
importantly, directly or indirectly connected to the decision-making process.” Therefore 
policy networks help us to understand the interests and the policy process, which links 
political economy and policy analysis. Those involved in policy networks are state actors 
such as those within the executive and legislature, and societal actors such as industry, 
interest groups, NGOs, the public, and mass media. The interaction of state and societal 
actors in the policy making process characterizes policy networks. Hessing et al., use 
the policy cycle model and look at policy networks within the five stages of the model to 
understand resource and environmental policy in Canada.  
 Policy networks can be classified by the number and type of participants and 
their relations with one another. Hessing et al. recognize eight subsystems which policy 
networks can be classified in, depending on whether the networks are state directed or 
society dominated, as well as on the number of societal groups that are involved in the 
network. In some cases issues take place solely within the state and therefore are 
classified as bureaucratic networks, in which interactions exist between state officials 
only. More commonly however, societal groups are involved in these interactions. 
Pluralistic networks for example, are state directed but involve interactions with at least 
three or more societal groups. In cases where there is only one other societal actor 
beyond the state, the societal actor is usually a business interest. In this case if the state 
directs the business interest the network is categorized at a clientelistic network, and if 
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the reverse is true, wherein the business interest dominates the state, this is referred to 
as a captured network. Of the eight taxonomies of policy networks, pluralistic networks 
are most common in the environmental policy process.  
When examining policy networks within resource and environmental policy, 
Hessing et al. find that significant change has not, and is unlikely to occur in the near 
future. In this pluralistic policy network, non-economic and economic interests, as well as 
the media interact with one another, as well as with state actors. Non-economic interests 
such as environmental NGOs use fundraising and public education as techniques to 
spread potential ecologically sound solutions to Canada's environmental problems. The 
media has a crucial role to play here with helping to highlight events, and educational 
campaigns. However, the media prefers to highlight specific events rather than chronic 
problems, such as environmental degradation which requires long term policy options. 
Media outlets are also connected to economic interests, and run advertising campaigns 
in favour of these interests. This also makes it difficult for non-economic interests to 
affect policy formulation. Economic interests such as industry are at an advantage, not 
only financially, but they also have considerable expertise on policy making and policy 
procedures. Industry groups tend to be well established and have clear goals, therefore 
when policy windows arise; they are usually well prepared to offer solutions. In addition 
to industry actors, state actors play a significant role in policy formulation. Particularly, 
the executive comprised of the prime minister and his/her cabinet members who act as 
key players in policy making through powers granted to them by the constitution to 
govern the country. If the government is dominated by, or has close relations with other 
policy subsystems, such as industry members, Hessing et al., find that these interactions 
result in an incremental approach to policy making, based on bargaining, rather than a 
comprehensive rational approach.  
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Overall, Hessing et al. find that depending on how much access to the policy 
arena, and decision making power that subsystem members have, will determine how 
members are represented in the policy process. For example, productive actors such as 
businesses or industry who have a direct economic interest tend to be at an economic 
and institutional advantage, providing them with access to the policy arena and decision 
making power, and as a result are able to overcome the disadvantages that might be 
faced by public interest groups. Therefore, Hessing et al. find that when you have in-
cohesive policy networks that are operating across different areas creating an arena of 
fragmentation, it is difficult to promote rational outcomes. Since policy networks provide 
an arena for consultation and exchange of information, and an area to negotiate 
decisions, when you have a complex network structure, and a high level of institutional 
constraint, the result is incremental adjustments to policy making rather than real 
change. As a result, major disagreements in Canadian resources and environmental 
policy have shaped the politics of policy making in this sector.  
The analysis of resource and environmental policy undertaken by Hessing et al., 
informs this paper, and thus an analysis of policy networks in the climate change policy 
process can help us to understand its success or failure. In chapter three I look at 
climate policy in Canada through an intuitional, political economic, societal and 
ideational framework in the context of policy networks and argue that jurisdictional 
ambiguity and the strong relationships between the state and economic interests have 
placed a significant barrier on moving forward on climate change. In chapter four, I apply 
this same framework to the German context and argue that the close ties between non-
economic actors such as environmental groups and state officials, along with the overall 
general agreement within the climate policy community that action on climate change is 
required, has helped to foster a progressive climate change policy in the country. In 
chapter five I tie my arguments for each country together to highlight the key differences 
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in the interactions of institutions, economic interests, societal actors, and the general 
ideas about climate change.  
CHAPTER TWO: CLIMATE CHANGE BACKGROUNDER 
 
How climate change became a prominent issue 
 
 Today the debate over anthropogenic climate change is largely settled, with 
majority of scientists in agreement that it may be one of the greatest environmental, 
social, and economic threats facing the planet. Despite being subject to uncertainties, 
climate science is well established and understood. The intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), has 
consistently provided increasingly clear statements about the scale, impacts and future 
risks of recent climate change (IPCC, 2013; Compston and Bailey, 2008).  
 The concern of global warming has been around for a long time. Over a century 
ago, Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius put forward the greenhouse warming theory, 
by studying how changes in the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could alter 
surface temperature (Arrhenius, 1896). He found what scientists today have similarly 
found, which is that an increase in carbon dioxide content in the atmosphere, causes 
increases in the temperature. This was later confirmed by a scientist from the University 
of California, San Diego, Charles David Keeling. Keeling began collecting data of carbon 
dioxide content of our air in 1958 by taking continuous measurements at the Mauna Loa 
Observatory in Hawaii, and at the South Pole. By 1960 Keeling had discovered a yearly 
increase in carbon dioxide which was consistent with the amount of fuels burned each 
year (Keeling, 1960). This data, which is commonly referred to as the Keeling curve is 
“one of the undisputed facts in the climate change controversy, and led to the initial 
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growth of scientific concern in the late 1960s and early 1970s” (Bodansky, 2001). 
 Atmospheric measurements of carbon dioxide continued with improved computing 
power and more sophisticated computer models, leading to more accurate global 
warming predictions. In addition to the carbon dioxide content, scientists in the mid-80s 
began to recognize various other atmospheric trace gases that were also contributing to 
the greenhouse effect, such as methane and nitrous oxides. With greater certainty, 
scientists began to conclude in the late 70s to early 80s that anthropogenic climate 
change was in fact real, and that it would have negligible effects (Bodansky, 2001; 
National Research Council, 1979, viii).  
 The scientific evidence of an increase in carbon dioxide contributing to global 
warming has helped to bring the issue of climate change to the public and political 
sphere. However, with further pressure from a group of scientists who had close ties to 
WMO and UNEP, were acting as knowledge brokers, and they were able to effectively 
communicate the issue. As a result, climate change emerged as an issue on the 
international agenda (Bodansky, 2001). Moreover, the late 80s was a time when 
environmental issues were generally at the forefront of public concern due to the 
discovery of the depleting ozone layer caused by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, pollution of the oceans, and problems with hazardous 
waste. This led to the UNCED process and the publishing of the Brudtland Report, Our 
Common Future, in 1987. This report placed a great emphasis on sustainable 
development, and helped to spread the message to the public about issues of the 
environment and sustainability. For this reason, making the connection between human 
activities altering the environment was becoming easier to make and increasingly well 
known. And finally, when North America was hit with a heat wave and drought in 1988, 
greenhouse warming had become even more prominent in the U.S. and Canada, and as 
a result of all these factors, the first conference on reducing global CO2 emissions was 
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held in Toronto in 1988. From this point forward, international conferences on climate 
change began to take place regularly, most famously the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), holds an annual Conference of the Parties 
(COP), in which member states come together to agree on ambitious greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets, and discussions on how best to move forward on the issue 
of climate change.  
A scientific primer 
 
 As discussed above, the science of climate change has been researched and 
studied for a long time, beginning over a century ago with Svante Arrhenius’ work. Since 
then it has come a long way; the debate over the science of anthropogenic climate 
change is over with 97% of the scientific community now in agreement that human 
induced climate change is a real and a serious issue (Anderegg, et al., 2010; John Cook 
et al., 2013; Powell, 2013). Such a consensus comes despite some of the scientific 
uncertainties that are inherent within the climate change phenomenon. It is crucial for the 
general public to understand the basics of the science of climate change in order to 
appreciate the severity of this problem. 
The Atmosphere and Oceans are getting warmer:  
 
 At the current moment we are faced with the reality of a warming atmosphere and 
oceans, diminishing snow and ice cover and a rising sea level. The last three decades 
have shown increasingly warmer surface temperatures since the late 1800s [see figure 
1] (Kennedy, 2013). “The ocean is the largest solar energy collector on Earth” and 
covers 70% of the Earth’s surface (Dahlman, 2015), therefore as atmospheric 
temperatures rise, oceans absorb the heat and thus become warmer. As a result, the 
average global ocean heat content has been increasing worldwide since the late 1800s 
(IPCC, 2014). There has been a significant increase in the ocean heat content of the 
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upper layers of the ocean in the past two decades, as displayed in Figure 2 (NOAA, 
2016; Dahlman, 2015). This increase in the ocean heat content has effects on the 
Earth’s cryosphere which, consists of all the frozen water that is part of the Earth’s 
system, for example ice sheets, glaciers and snow cover. Over the last two decades we 
have seen the glaciers shrink worldwide, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have 
declined in mass, and the spring snow cover in the Northern Hemisphere has been 
shrinking (IPCC, 2014). As a result of such trends, like an increase in melting snow and 
ice, and expanding oceans from increased ocean heat content, the global mean sea 
level rose by 0.19 m from 1901 -  2010, and is continuing to rise (Kopp et al., 2016; 
Rietbroek et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1. The graph above shows that during the last 3 decades, each successive decade has 
been warmer than the next. (Caitlyn Kennedy, 2013)  
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Figure 2. The graph above shows the global average ocean heat content from 1955 to 2010 in 
the top 700 m of the ocean. The graph is provided by NOAA’s Ocean Climate Laboratory (2016), 
which was updated from Levitus et al. (2012).  
Earth’s Energy Budget and Climate Feedbacks  
 
 In order to accurately account for the Earth’s climate, we must look to the Earth’s 
energy budget. The Earth has an energy budget, which accounts for the amount of 
energy from the sun that enters and leaves the climate system; this flow of incoming and 
outgoing energy in the form of solar radiation, is the Earth’s energy budget. In order to 
maintain a stable temperature on Earth, the amount of incoming and outgoing solar 
radiation must be equal. When the Earth’s radiative equilibrium is out of balance, due to 
changes to the Earth's climate system that affect the amount of energy that enters or 
leaves the system, this can result in temperatures to rise or fall. The destabilizing 
mechanisms in this process are referred to as climate forcings. There are natural climate 
forcings and human caused climate forcings. Natural climate forcings include changes in 
the brightness of the sun and Earth’s orbit, and significant volcanic eruptions. While 
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human caused forcings include particle pollutions such as aerosols, deforestation, 
increase in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. These climate forcings have an 
effect on the amount of sunlight that is absorbed on Earth and reflected back to space, 
contributing to the rise and fall of temperatures. For example, natural climate forcings 
such as large volcanic eruptions eject particles into the stratosphere, which reflect 
incoming sunlight and cool the Earth’s atmosphere. On the other hand, a human-caused 
climate forcing such as increased concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide absorb 
incoming sunlight, which causes less heat to radiate back to space and therefore warm 
the Earth’s atmosphere. 
 The above-mentioned climate forcings can trigger feedbacks in the climate system, 
which either diminish or intensify the original forcing. There are positive and negative 
feedbacks that exist in the climate system, which help us to determine the structural 
stability of our climate system. Positive feedbacks are those mechanisms, which amplify 
either the cooling or the warming of the climate, whereas negative feedbacks are those 
mechanisms which result in an opposite effect of the initial forcing. For example, ice 
albedo is a positive feedback mechanism because as the climate cools there is 
increased ice and snow cover, which increases the amount of solar that is reflected back 
into space, and therefore there is a further increase in cooling. Another example of a 
positive feedback is water vapour, which is one of the strongest greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. As the temperature increases, there is an increase in evaporation from the 
oceans, which adds more water vapour into the atmosphere, and since water vapour is a 
greenhouse gas, it further increases the surface temperature by trapping the increased 
heat. Increased evaporation from the oceans caused by an increase in surface 
temperature can also be a negative feedback. For example, the increased evaporation 
from the oceans might cause more low-level clouds to form, which reflect more sunlight 
back into space, causing a slight decrease in surface temperature. 
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 The ocean plays a crucial role in stabilizing the Earth’s climate system because; it 
has the “ability to store and release heat over long periods of time” (Dahlman, 2015). 
This is a natural process in the Earth’s system, where by the ocean absorbs energy from 
the sun and stores it as heat without causing an increase in atmospheric temperature. 
The heat is absorbed at the surface of the ocean, but later ocean currents, and waves 
move this heat deeper into the water and around the world. The heat capacity of oceans 
is much higher than the atmosphere, and therefore can absorb large amounts of heat 
energy at only slight increases in temperature; this helps to alleviate some of the 
warming in the atmosphere (NOAA, 2016). The problem however, occurs because there 
has been a significant increase in the heat content at the upper levels of the ocean, 
which has been absorbed through excess heat from the atmosphere. This excess heat is 
accumulating as a result of an increase in greenhouse gases that are preventing heat 
from escaping the Earth’s atmosphere. This increase in heat content at the oceans 
surface is an important factor in understanding the global climate. Since heat from the 
ocean eventually re-enters the Earth’s system, the ocean has the ability to continue to 
warm the Earth even decades after the heat was absorbed. Therefore, even if we were 
to halt the release of anthropogenic greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, warming 
will continue due to the increased ocean heat content. Consequently, it is important to 
keep track of how much heat energy the ocean absorbs and releases in order to 
understand and model global climate.  
Why are the Ocean and Atmosphere Getting Warmer? 
 
 The main source of warming on Earth is light from the sun, but the observed 
warming that has been taking place has not been the result of the variation in the 
amount of incoming sunlight. Instead, it has largely been caused by the increasing 
atmospheric content of carbon dioxide and amplified by an increase in water vapour and 
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methane. As mentioned above, it was Charles David Keeling who, in 1958, first began 
keeping a record of the amount of carbon dioxide content in our air, on a monthly basis, 
measuring it in parts per million by volume (ppmv), at the Mauna Loa Laboratory on the 
Pacific island of Hawaii. His son Ralph Keeling, continued to collect this data and as of 
March, 2016, the average value of carbon dioxide was 406 ppmv.  
 The main source of increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is the burning of 
fossil fuels (IPCC, 2014). As the population grows the amount of fossil fuels we burn 
increases, which causes the release of more carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide heats the 
atmosphere by creating a barrier for infrared radiation to escape back into space. 
Instead, the infrared radiation gets trapped, and warms the atmospheric carbon dioxide 
molecules. The heated carbon dioxide then collide with and warm nitrogen and oxygen 
molecules which account for 99% of the air. If we had no GHGs however, too much heat 
would escape to space and it would be too cold for life to survive on Earth. Therefore, 
the higher the CO2 content the more infrared radiation that gets trapped and the more 
warming there will be. Furthermore, as the air becomes warmer it holds more water 
vapour, which as mentioned above is another greenhouse gas therefore contributing to 
further warming. Methane is another greenhouse gas which absorbs infrared radiation at 
greater volumes than carbon dioxide; however, methane releases the heat much faster 
than carbon dioxide. Methane is still a concern, because as the climate is warming, there 
is uncertainty around the amount of Methane that will be released in a short period of 
time, which will greatly amplify warming.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN CANADA 
Institutional Framework 
Governance Structure 
 
 In Canada the political structure operates within a constitutional order, in addition 
to a set of international treaties, organizations, and agreed upon rules, between 
sovereign states that set the parameters in which these states will operate. The 
constitution sets out the fundamental rights of citizens and determines the distribution of 
powers among state actors, as well as the relationship between the state and its citizens 
(Olive, 2016). It is the Constitution which defines the responsibilities of the federal and 
the provincial governments, which results in inherent complications for environmental 
policymaking; this will be discussed further below. In addition to the Constitution, 
Canada operates within a parliamentary democracy; in which elected and appointed 
officials make decisions. Canada’s parliamentary democracy is made up of three 
branches of government: the executive, legislative and judicial branch.  
 The executive includes the monarch as the head of state; her representative in 
Canada, the governor general; and the prime minister as well as his cabinet and 
bureaucracy. Although the monarch and governor general hold largely symbolic roles, 
the prime minister and his cabinet are responsible for making policy and laws, whereas 
the bureaucracy’s main role is to administer those policies. The legislative, commonly 
referred to as Parliament includes the House of Commons and the Senate. The House 
of Commons is comprised by elected officials known as Members of Parliament (MPs). 
The political party that holds the most seats in the House of Commons is the party that 
will form government, and the party with the most seats holds the majority in the House 
of Commons and therefore, it becomes very easy to pass legislation. For example when 
voting on a bill the governing party, if it is a majority, already has enough votes to pass 
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the bill. The House of Commons is intended to be representative of the Canadian 
population, and therefore aims to raise issues and represent the needs of the population 
in a fair manner. The Senate is also included in the legislative, which consists of 105 
members appointed by the governor general at the recommendation of the prime 
minister. The Senate should be representative of the region, and therefore Ontario, 
Quebec, the Maritimes, and the Western provinces are each granted 24 seats, each of 
the territories are granted 1 seat each and Newfoundland and Labrador has 6 seats. 
Although, the Senate does not have any party affiliation, since the prime minister selects 
the senators, he is likely to select members affiliated with his party. Similar to the House 
of Commons, the Senate has the same legislative responsibility. In order to become law, 
a bill has to pass through both the House of Commons and Senate. Lastly, the judiciary, 
although it is not part of parliament, it does play a crucial role in confirming the 
constitutionality of laws and policy, and includes the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
federal and provincial court systems, and military courts. These three branches work 
together to create, enact, and enforce law in Canada, and therefore are important to 
understand climate change policy.  
Multilevel Governance  
 
 Canada is a federal country, which means power is divided between the national 
and subnational levels of government. As mentioned above the Constitution has set out 
the law making powers of each level of government, so that neither level can make 
changes to the other level’s powers, without the full consent of Parliament and all of the 
provinces (Olive, 2016). That said however, the Constitution Act, 1867, is not clear at 
identifying power over matters related to the environment. Section 91 of the Constitution 
does provide some clear authority over the environment to the federal government. For 
example, the federal government holds authority over matters related to navigation and 
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shipping, seacoasts and fisheries, International boarders, trade and commerce, 
international relations, and criminal law, including jurisdiction of all federal lands and 
activities. The 1867 Constitution also grants federal government the power to make laws 
for the “peace, order, and good government of Canada” (POGG), in which case the 
federal government can override provincial powers in the case of a “national crisis”, but 
the constitutional law remains unclear with this. Section 92 of the Constitution grants 
clear environmental powers to the provinces, which include the management and sale of 
public lands, property and civil rights, and matters of a merely local or private nature. 
Upon updating of the constitution in 1982, provinces also gained clear jurisdiction of non-
renewable natural resources, forestry, and electric energy (Olive, 2016). Although at 
face value from the Constitution, it may seem like the national and subnational 
relationship with the environment is clear, in reality this is far from the case in Canada. 
Often times, jurisdiction overlaps, for example in the case of water, the federal 
government has jurisdiction over fisheries, navigation, and international waters, and the 
provinces have jurisdiction over water resources and supply, complicating the 
relationship between which level of government holds jurisdiction over water.  
 When we look at the division of powers between the provinces, we can see that 
Ontario and Quebec hold the greatest influence in federalism by virtue of their population 
- 60% of Canada’s population is concentrated in these two provinces alone. Therefore, 
Ontario and Quebec hold the most seats in Parliament and as a result, their interests are 
often predominately influential when it comes to guiding Canadian policy. Consequently, 
Western and Eastern provinces largely rely on their provincial governments to meet their 
needs and interests. In 2006 however, when Stephen Harper was elected as Prime 
Minister of the conservative party, he brought in open federalism, which provided greater 
independence to provinces by shifting more power from the federal towards the 
provincial governments moving away from a more collaborative approach to governance 
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(Olive, 2016). This was great news for the Western and Eastern provinces that often 
primarily looked towards provincial governance, as there would now be less federal level 
oversight.  
International Context  
 
 Beyond federal and provincial policy-making powers in Canada, various other 
actors exist that play a role in policy-making in the international and municipal arenas. 
For example, at the international level, the United Nations (UN), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the United States (US) have implications for 
climate change policy making in Canada. Although no other country or international 
organization can make laws for Canada, they can surely influence decisions made within 
Canada, since as an industrialized country, it participates heavily in the international 
arena. At a more local scale, municipalities are granted certain powers by provinces in 
the areas of transportation, energy use, and water use, and therefore influence 
environmental policy (Olive, 2016).  
Analysis 
 
 This section will analyze the above-mentioned institutional factors specifically with 
respect to climate change. Federalism in Canada has placed a significant barrier to 
climate change policy in this country. The federal-provincial relationship with regards to 
climate change has markedly lacked coordination. Although the Constitution gives 
jurisdiction to federal and provincial governments through section 91 and 92, it does not 
clearly mention of who has jurisdiction over the environment. Section 132 of the 
Constitution gives the federal government authority to sign international treaties, and 
therefore was able to, without consultation with the provinces, sign the Kyoto Protocol 
and make international commitments to reduce GHG emissions. The provinces, however 
have jurisdiction over most of the resources on Crown land under Section 109 of the 
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Constitution, and have jurisdiction over non-renewable resources under Section 92A, 
and therefore, they will have a significant role to play in ensuring federal level GHG 
emissions reduction commitments (Hessing et al., 2005).  
 In recognizing the crucial role both levels of government play towards action on 
climate change, a system for policy co-ordination has been in place in the form of the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and the Canadian Council of 
Energy Ministers. An extensive system of federal-provincial committees, report to both of 
these Councils in hopes of achieving policy coordination. In all of the mechanisms that 
involve efforts to reach some form of policy coordination, decision making is consensual, 
which means any one jurisdiction can veto and therefore weaken the ability of the 
institutional system to facilitate negotiated agreements (Gordon and Macdonald, 2009). 
The CCME “is the primary minister-led intergovernmental forum for collective action on 
environmental issues of national and international concern” (CCME, 2014).  
 Two committees that attempted to act as a tool for coordination, in 1992-1997 the 
Joint Ministers Meeting (JMM), and in 1998-2002 the National Climate Change Process 
(NCCAP), both failed and an agreement to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 could not be 
reached (Gordon and Macdonald, 2009). Since then there has been no real effort to 
coordinate federal and provincial climate policy, although recent efforts through the 
mechanism of the First Ministers meeting, may change this path. The agenda items for 
First Ministers meetings with the Prime Minister and provincial and territorial Premiers, 
have historically been policy fields other than climate change, such as health and 
aboriginal affairs for example, and have been inconsistent with having regular meeting. 
Before the change in government in 2015, the last First Ministers meeting was held in 
2009 and its focus was the financial crisis. In 2015 the Trudeau government made a 
commitment to have regular annual First Ministers meetings, and climate change was 
the main topic of discussion. Therefore we may begin to see a shift in climate change 
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policy coordination; however, it is too early to tell exactly how effective this will be.  
 In addition to federal-provincial barriers, friction between federal ministries in the 
past has also made it difficult to achieve a coherent national climate change policy. 
Particularly, the departments of Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCan) have differed in their preferred approach to moving forward on emission 
reduction targets. For example, during the time of the National Action Plan on Climate 
Change (NAPCC) in 1993-1995, then Environment Minister, Shiela Copps preferred 
emission reductions, whereas, NRCan Minister Anne McLellan, preferred a more 
voluntary approach which was favoured by the petroleum industry and conservative 
government in Alberta (Gordon and Macdonald, 2009). 
 In the international arena, Canada has institutions in place to establish 
coordination with the US, and have made commitments under international frameworks 
most notably the UNFCCC. Although thus far, commitments have been made on a 
voluntary basis and due to the lack of federal consultation with the provinces prior to 
making such commitments, Canada has never been able to achieve their GHG reduction 
commitments. In the case of the US, Canada has a vested interest to coordinate climate 
policy with their international counterparts, for the sake of international trade and to 
remain competitive in the economic market. Due to this fear of crippling it’s 
competitiveness and in turn the economy Canada’s federal government has largely 
placed an emphasis on voluntary approaches to reducing emissions (Macdonald and 
Smith, 2000).  
 Overall, since the Canadian Constitution gives jurisdictional responsibility over 
natural resources to provinces, it is not fully clear whether emissions related to these 
resources should be the sole responsibility of the provinces or whether it should be a 
shared responsibility between provinces and the federal government. It is however 
certain that climate change policy in Canada will require the full cooperation of federal 
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and provincial governments, as well as between interdepartmental divisions such as 
Environment and Climate Change Canada and Natural Resources Canada. Although the 
federal government might have the final say during international agreements, it is largely 
in the hand of the provinces, whether or not those commitments will be implemented. 
Therefore it is in the best interest of the federal government to work closely with the 
provinces.  
Political Economic Context  
 
 The political economic context of climate change policy in Canada helps to further 
explain the failure of the ability of institutions to reach a coordinated policy for the 
country. Knowledge of Canada’s geography can help to explain some of the challenges 
faced by the federal government. Canada’s population is largely clustered around major 
cities located along the southern most parts of the border. Over half of the country’s 
population resides in Ontario and Quebec, combined these provinces have 61.5% of 
Canada’s total population (Stats Can, 2016). The Western provinces have 31.6% of the 
population, and the Atlantic provinces have just 6.6% of the total population (Stats Can, 
2016). Since seats in the House of Commons are distributed among the provinces in 
proportion to the population, majority of seats represent the interests of only a few 
provinces. This is important to consider, particularly in the context of natural resources. 
In addition to the distribution of the population, the regional economies of the provinces 
also vary. The natural resource industries in Canada have historically been a significant 
contributor to the country’s economic activity, and many areas of the country remain 
dependent on them today. In the west coast and the Atlantic provinces we find fishery 
and forestry, agriculture and fossil fuels in the prairies, and manufacturing in the Ontario-
Quebec St. Lawrence river corridor (Gordon and Macdonald, 2009).  
 As a result of varying economies across provinces, different regions rely on 
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different sources of energy. Energy has a crucial role to play in climate change 
mitigation, because energy, specifically from fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and 
coal is a major contributor to GHG emissions and therefore, climate change. In this 
sense energy policy and climate change policy are closely linked, with energy policy 
having significant ramifications for climate change policy and vice versa. As mentioned 
earlier, provinces have full jurisdiction over their natural resources and therefore, with 
such a diverse set of interests and economies, working closely with provinces to achieve 
a unified national climate change policy has thus far proved to be a difficult task.  
 Due to varying regional economies, the geography of Canada’s GHG emissions is 
highly variable between provinces with Alberta contributing the most to the national 
growth in GHG emissions (ECCC, 2016). This variation largely stems from the energy 
sector. Quebec and Manitoba generate electricity through hydroelectric power, and 
therefore have relatively low per capita GHG emissions. Oil producing provinces like 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland have much higher per capita GHG emissions 
and therefore are more reluctant to commit to national GHG emission reductions 
because economically, these provinces are more vulnerable to rigorous climate change 
policy. 
Sub-national Contributions to GHG emissions  
 
 Provinces and territories have varying degrees of GHG emission targets, some are 
more ambitious than others, but all are unique to their economic and political situations. 
Below is a brief synopsis of GHG emission contributions of the provinces and territories.  
 British Columbia (BC) is the fifth largest emitter of GHG emissions in absolute 
terms, contributing to 9% of national emissions as of 2014 (Pembina, 2016). BC’s 
biggest emitting sectors include oil and gas at 33%, waste and other at 22%, and waste, 
coal production, light manufacturing, construction and forestry at 17%. BC has been 
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known to be fairly progressive in terms of implementing climate policies, and has 
decreased emissions 4% from 2005 to 2014 (ibid). It was one of the first provinces to 
implement climate policies including introducing a provincial carbon tax, commitments to 
improved energy and conservation and renewable energy development, and committing 
to a carbon neutral public sector (ibid).  
 In Canada, Alberta is the largest contributor to GHG emissions in absolute terms, 
and the second largest emitter per capita, contributing to more than 37% of Canada’s 
total emissions (Pembina, 2016). A majority of the emissions from Alberta are from the 
oil and gas sector, which represents 48% of its total emissions. Electricity and 
transportation represent 16% and 11% of its emissions respectively (Pembina, 2016). 
Alberta has large deposits of bitumen, which is petroleum in the form of a thick, tar like 
black sand from which oil can be extracted from. Due to the large amount of bitumen in 
Alberta, the province is the largest exporter of oil in the country (CAPP, 2015), and the 
largest supplier of oil to the US (EIA, 2015). The process to extract oil from bitumen is 
highly carbon intensive and contributes to 8.5% of Canada’s GHG emissions 
(Environment Canada, 2015, pt. 1, 63). The provinces total GHG emissions increased by 
18% from 2005 to 2014; this was the largest increase in emissions across the provinces. 
Unlike BC, Alberta has been slower to implement climate change policies, and has made 
limited progress towards introducing policies to reduce emissions. In the past year 
however, under a new NDP government the province has released a “Climate 
Leadership Plan” in November 2015 which addresses some of its major emitting 
sources, but it does not include emission reduction targets (Pembina, 2016).  
 Saskatchewan, which borders Alberta, is another oil and gas producing province, 
and is the fourth largest emitter of GHGs in Canada. 34% of emissions in this province 
are from the oil and gas sector, 22% are from agriculture and 19% from electricity. 
Emissions here have also been on the rise since 2005, increasing 8% by 2014, 
 31 
indicating a lack of progress made on any sort of climate change mitigation policies. 
Despite some progress on integrating and increasing renewable energy capacity, the 
province has not established a specific GHG reduction target.  
 The province of Manitoba only contributed about 3% to national GHG emissions in 
2014. This low contribution to national GHG emissions is largely due to its heavy 
reliance on hydro-electric power for electricity generation. Manitoba’s largest contributor 
of GHG emissions is the transportation sector at 35% of all the provinces emissions, 
followed by the agriculture sector at 31% and buildings at 14% (Pembina, 2016). 
Between 2005 and 2014 a 4% increase in GHG emissions has been observed, but since 
2015 the province has committed to concrete emission reduction targets for 2030 and 
2050. In order to reach their targets however, Manitoba must implement more 
aggressive measures in the transportation industry and consider a carbon pricing 
mechanism.  
 Ontario contributed to 23% of national GHG emissions in 2014, and is the second 
largest emitter (in absolute terms), but third lowest per capita. The largest GHG 
emissions come from the transportation sector accounting for 33% of the province’s 
emissions, the buildings and emissions intensive trade export sectors account for 22%, 
and the iron, steel, chemicals and fertilizers industries account for 18%. Through the 
2009 Green Energy and Green Economy Act and the 2014 phase out and ban of coal-
fired electricity generation, since 2005-2014 emissions in Ontario have decreased 19%. 
Moving forward, the province has plans to put a price on carbon through an international 
carbon market, called the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and legally binding emission 
reduction targets. 
 Quebec like Ontario is a large emitter of GHG emissions in absolute terms, but 
happens to be the lowest emitting province on a per capita basis. Quebec contributed 
11% of emissions to the country in 2014, with 37% coming from the transportation 
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sector, 21% from emissions intensive trade exposed industries, and 13% from waste, 
light manufacturing, construction and forestry. Quebec has one of the most ambitious 
GHG emission reduction targets, and has made significant process with its carbon cap 
and trade system which Quebec starting with California under the Western Climate 
Initiate through a bilateral agreement.  
 New Brunswick contributed only 2% to Canada’s GHG emissions, however on a 
per capita basis the province was in the top 5 emitters in Canada in 2014. New 
Brunswick’s electricity sector contributes to the most GHG emissions at 31%, then the 
transportation sector at 26% and the oil and gas industry at 19%. Despite an overall 
decrease in emissions of 27% from 2005-2014, in the absence of legislation to reduce 
industrial and transportation emissions, the province is on track for an increase in GHG 
emissions, reversing any progress made, and failing to meet provincial reduction targets 
(Hazlewood, 2015). 
 Nova Scotia contributed to 2.3% of Canada’s total emissions in 2014, with the 
electricity sector, transportation sector, and buildings contributing 80% of the province’s 
emissions today. Nova Scotia has seen the largest decrease in emissions at a 29% 
decrease between 2005 and 2014. The province has one of the most carbon-intensive 
electricity grids in Canada, since majority of electricity plants are fired by coal. Despite 
this, some progress has been made, with an introduction of a declining cap on emissions 
from the electricity sector, an increase in renewable electricity target of 40% by 2020, 
and increasing overall energy efficiency. Progress on emission reductions may be 
stalled however, as the Community Feed-in Tariff (COMFIT) program for renewable 
energy projects was discontinued in 2015. This program played a pivotal role in GHG 
emission reductions. Although the province has done a lot with implementing programs 
for energy efficiency and reduction, little has been done for the transportation sector, 
which could benefit from some sort of carbon pricing mechanism, not yet implemented in 
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the province.  
 Prince Edward Island (PEI) contributed to less than 1% of Canada’s total 
emissions in 2014; however its emissions per capita are close to Ontario’s. The 
transportation sector contributes to majority of emissions at 40%, and buildings and 
agriculture contributed to 22% of total emissions. From 2005 - 2014 the province saw a 
13% decrease in emissions. PEI is also part of the New England governors and other 
Atlantic premiers climate reduction targets. Overall the province has been slow in 
adopting policies to reduce emissions from key emitting sectors, but it has shown 
national leadership on wind energy development, taking advantage of its unique wind 
energy potential. In order to alleviate emissions from transportation and buildings sector, 
PEI can also benefit from a carbon pricing scheme, which has not been implemented.  
 Newfoundland and Labrador contributes to 2% of national emissions, and is 
Canada’s 3rd largest per capita emitter. Majority of emissions come from the 
transportation sector at 33%, oil and gas sector at 25% and electricity sector at 11%. 
From the time period of 2005 to 2014, emissions in the province rose 4%. Although in 
recent years, Newfoundland and Labrador has invested in energy projects that will 
contribute towards reducing emissions such as the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project, 
the province has large offshore oil and gas finds as well as continued mining sector 
development, which will offset any progress made (IISD, 2014). Similar to the other 
Atlantic Provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador is involved in the New England 
governors and other Atlantic premiers climate reduction targets, and also does not have 
any sort of carbon pricing mechanism in place.  
 Canada’s Territories, Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories contributed to 
less than 1% of the country’s GHG emissions in 2014. Since climate change will begin to 
have a greater effect in the northern parts of the country first, the territories have taken 
adaptation and mitigation into serious consideration in climate plans. Between 2005 and 
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2014 the territories have seen a 16% decrease in emissions. Since emissions are 
relatively low, there has been great focus on adaptation measures. That said however, 
much of the electricity generated in remote areas comes from diesel, and much of the 
energy in the territories is sourced from fossil fuels; therefore the territories could 
significantly benefit from an increase in renewable energy projects.  
Analysis  
 
 As we can see, provinces vary in their level GHG emissions and in their 
approaches to reducing emissions. Despite provincial jurisdiction over natural resources, 
the federal government shares jurisdiction over environmental matters with the provinces 
under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), and since matters of energy 
and climate are inherently linked, the federal government can interfere in provincial 
matters related to energy generation (Macdonald et al., 2015). Historically the federal 
government’s role in climate change policy has been to commit to reduction targets at 
the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. However, upon setting reduction targets, the 
federal government has largely left it to provinces to achieve the target with minimal 
involvement on their part. This has led to an uncoordinated set of policies and little 
progress has been made. Since climate change is a global collective-action problem, 
GHGs produced in one region will affect all regions. For example, if a province like BC 
has decided to reduce emissions and has set in place an ambitious program for GHG 
emission reductions, and a province like Alberta is ramping up oil sands production, any 
progress BC has made in reducing emissions for the Country will be offset by the actions 
of Alberta. Therefore, it is in the best interest for provinces to work together with the 
federal government towards a coordinated climate policy.  
 The federal government also holds authority over pollution regulation and authority 
over inter-provincial and international energy matters, which includes energy 
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infrastructure projects such as pipelines (Macdonald et al., 2015). Since the federal 
government does share jurisdiction on both policy matters (climate and energy) if it so 
chooses, it can step in to coordinate and address issues pertaining to both matters. 
Historically, however, the federal government has taken a back seat, giving the 
provinces autonomy and leadership in sorting out the issues. This is largely due to the 
fact that Canada is a strong decentralized federation in which the provinces have 
significant power, and therefore, for the sake of avoiding conflict the federal government 
has preferred not to interfere (Macdonald et al., 2015; Stevenson, 2000). Instead, 
previous federal governments have moved forward on climate change with largely 
voluntary instruments, and made it clear that no province shall incur undue burden as a 
result of implementing climate change measures. This will be further discussed below in 
the “Ideas and discourses” section, since much of this direction stems from ideas about 
resources and economy versus the environment.  
International Context   
 
 In addition to the political-economic domestic concerns, there has also been 
concern over economic losses that would result if Canada deviates too far from US 
climate policy. Given Canada’s abundant natural resources, and since the US is 
Canada’s largest trading partner, any climate and energy policy choices in the US will 
have major economic and environmental implications for Canada. Much of Canadian 
policy has been driven by the US while taking a “back seat” to avoid suffering 
economically by unilaterally moving forward on climate change commitments 
(Macdonald & Smith, 2000). For this reason, historically we have seen Canada align any 
federal level climate change commitments with US policy. For example, during the 
negotiations leading up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol meeting in Japan, both countries 
shared similar views in protecting their economies, and signed the Kyoto Protocol with 
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similar reduction targets. In the US however, the Senate greatly opposed the Kyoto 
targets and chose against ratification, deciding instead to move forward on the basis of 
voluntary instruments and expansion of climate science research. Canada, on the other 
hand, ratified Kyoto in 2002 under the direction of then Prime Minister Jean Chretien. 
Chretien’s action on ratifying Kyoto can be attributed to the fact that he would be retiring 
soon, and would not have to implement it, and as a result, attempts at coordinating any 
type of energy or climate policy failed, which resulted in a significant increase in 
emissions largely due to economic interests of provinces (Rabe, 2007). Emissions 
continued to rise under Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006, and in 2011 when he 
saw that it was nearly impossible to meet Kyoto reduction targets, Canada formally 
withdrew from the Protocol. One of the reasons stated for doing so was that our 
neighbour to the south had not ratified (CBC, 2011). In this sense, Canada’s climate 
policy has largely been driven my economic factors rather than concern for the 
environment. Historically, Canada’s priorities have been on trade, international 
competitiveness and domestic debt reduction, and climate change policy has taken a 
back seat. Any discussions during conferences held for the purpose of working towards 
mitigating climate change, revolved around concern for the economic implications it 
would have.  
Societal Forces  
Interest Groups and Non State Actors  
 
 An environmental problem such as climate change, carries with it a number of 
different interests that exist “beyond the institutional realm of party politics” (Greenberg 
et al., 2011). Third-party interest groups can range from special interest groups within 
established power centres to push private interests, by swaying political campaigns, to 
public interest/advocacy groups, including NGOs and think tanks, which play key roles in 
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the “formulation, implementation and evaluation of government decisions and policies”, 
those key roles, as described by Mark Winfield are “knowledge creators”, “knowledge 
brokers”, policy entrepreneurs”, implementing policy and delivering services”, public 
information, education, motivation and engagement”, and “watchdogs” (2014). As 
knowledge creators and brokers, NGOs conduct original research and analysis, and 
translate scientific and technical information into every day, easy to understand 
language for the public. Also, as independent entities from the government, and holding 
expertise in public policy, NGOs are well positioned to act as “watchdogs” for 
government decisions and activities, and are able to provide evidence-based analysis 
and policy advice (Winfield, 2014). In this sense they serve an important purpose for 
both holding the government of the day accountable, and informing the general public.  
 In Canada, NGOs and think tanks such as the Pembina Institute, Environmental 
Defence, and the Suzuki Foundation play the above-mentioned key roles in the public 
policy process, informing the public on the progress of the federal government’s actions 
related to the environment, and the consequences or benefits of those actions. With a 
strong focus on energy issues, the Pembina institute has a goal of “maintaining a healthy 
environment, a stable climate and prosperous communities requires collaboration, 
evidence-based decision making and innovate solutions” (Pembina, 2016). Through 
research and analysis, consulting, convening dialogue and inspiring collaboration, and 
from evidence-based and solutions-focused perspectives, the Pembina Institute helps to 
ensure decision makers, journalists and the public are well informed on technical and 
policy issues (Pembina, 2016). Other groups have also had an important role to play in 
informing the climate change debate. The David Suzuki Foundation, for example has 
been a key environmental group known to influence the global warming debate, and has 
been “recognized as one of Canada’s most trusted science-based environmental NGOs” 
(Greenberg et al., 2011).   
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 Advocacy groups under the Harper regime were threatened when the federal 
budget announced the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), would be conducting a series of 
audits specifically on environmental groups in Canada. These audits were directed 
specifically towards environmental groups that spoke out and critiqued the government’s 
economic strategy and decision to expand the oil sands. His government came out and 
said the purpose of the audits were to ensure that charitable organizations were not 
using funding for political activities. In fact, in the 2012 federal budget $8 million was 
dedicated to just that very purpose, even though environmental groups get legal advice 
to ensure that their activities are in line with CRA rules for charities (Winfield, 20140). 
These audits and investigations into environmental groups really constrained the ability 
for these groups to continue meaningful work, because with their credibility in question, 
funding opportunities were subject to uncertainty.  As Mark Winfield has pointed out, “the 
government’s actions reflect a lack of understanding of the role of non-governmental 
organizations in democratic governance, and the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of government decisions and policies" (2014). 
 In addition to advocacy groups, there are special interest groups who usually have 
a special interest in industry such as the fossil fuel industry. They tend to use their 
powerful positions to sway public opinion. In Canada for example, Friends of Science, a 
Calgary-based supposedly, non-profit organization has argued that anthropogenic 
climate change is not real, and it is solar activity that is contributing to any warming that 
is happening. The group advocates educating the public of the causes of climate change 
through, “relevant, balanced and objective technical scientific information” in which they 
push climate change denial information. The caveat with this group is that it has close 
ties with the Alberta oil industry, and receives substantial corporate funding and funds 
through suspicious mechanisms. For example, Montgomery (2006), a freelance 
journalist, investigated the funding scheme of the organization and found that 
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contributors to the organization would first donate their money to the Calgary 
Foundation, which is a non-profit organization that provides funding from anonymous 
donors to charitable organizations. The Calgary Foundation would channel money 
through the University of Calgary Science Education Fund established by professor 
Barry Cooper, who is known to have spoken out against the Liberal party, and has close 
ties with the federal Conservative party. Money from the Science Education Fund has 
funded much of the Friends of Science groups work in criticizing climate change 
initiatives (Greenberg et al., 2011). Therefore, although the organization had said that it 
was non-partisan, the ideas that came out of this organization were highly influenced by 
the special interests of the Conservative party and oil industry.  
Media  
 
 In Canada, Media has served an important purpose in reporting on the actions of 
federal governments, as well as on important scientific studies and issues surrounding 
climate change. Environmental Non-profit Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) have 
also been known to use media through public relations (PR) techniques in order to reach 
out to the public and policy makers (Greenberg et al., 2011). For example, David Suzuki 
has been a strategic user of public relation techniques, as a broadcaster for the CBC 
television program The Nature of Things, and with the use of advertisements which 
promote personal and government actions towards combating climate change 
(Greenberg et al., 2013). The Suzuki Foundation gets assistance with its PR from a 
Vancouver-based firm called James Hoggan & Associates. Hoggan not only counsels 
the Suzuki Foundation, but he is president of its board of directors. He believes that as a 
PR person that he has an obligation to play a constructive role in shaping environmental 
policy. He has particularly expressed his distaste with PR professionals that help to 
perpetuate doubt about climate change (Greenberg et al., 2011): 
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There is a line between public relations and propaganda - or there should be. And there is 
a difference between using your skills, in good faith, to help reduce a battered reputation 
and using them to twist the trust - to sow confusion and doubt on an issue that is critical to 
human survival… 
And it is infuriating - as a public relations professional - to watch my colleagues use their 
skills, their training and their considerable intellect to poison the international debate on 
climate change - Hoggan  
 
Hoggan’s position is critical to understanding that the information we receive through 
media outlets can be easily swayed using specific public interest techniques. For 
example, as mentioned above the interest group, Friends of Science, had very specific 
special interests, and after falsely identifying as non-partisan, ran advertising campaigns 
that specifically attacked action on climate change in Canada, playing a part in 
influencing the federal level election (Greenberg et al., 2011).  
 Scientists in government have also used media as an outlet to publish much of 
their research work and findings, usually through prestigious journals, and credible 
outlets. In the past decade however, under the Harper regime scientists were banned 
from talking to media outlets directly, and PR professionals were hired to speak on their 
behalf. It was this silencing of scientists that led to massive protests in Ottawa. Scientists 
held demonstrations on Parliament Hill to display their frustrations, and this issue 
became widely acknowledged, thanks to media outlets that reported on it. Environmental 
advocacy groups accompanied scientists, leveraging public relations techniques to get 
their point across and inform the public of the actions of the government of the time.  
 The federal government, in turn, has also used media as an outlet to promote their 
policies. In particular, the previous federal government allocated $9 million on 
advertising their responsible resource development program. This campaign, led by 
Natural Resources Canada, promotes pipelines, safety measures such as double-hulled 
oil tankers and changes to environmental laws as part of the government’s 2012 budget 
(Paris, 2012). The most important aspect of this campaign in terms of climate change 
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was that the federal government had weakened environmental laws through overhauls 
of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act 
and the Fisheries Act, and began a campaign to promote responsible resource 
development to reassure the public in light of such drastic changes. 
Public Opinion  
 
 In Canada, the public attitude of its citizens were looked at by Lachapelle et al. 
(2012), drawing on data from the 2011 National Survey of Canadian Public Opinion on 
Climate Change (NSCPOCC), in which data was collected through telephone surveys. 
When asked the question: “From what you have read and heard, is there solid evidence 
that the average temperature on Earth has been getting warmer over the past four 
decades?” 80 percent of Canadians answered yes to this question, therefore a majority 
of Canada does believe that Climate change is real and the earth is getting warmer. It is 
important to note however, the regional differences in the belief of climate change. In 
Canada, the difference in perception seems to vary in terms of GHG emissions per 
capita. For example in the two most carbon intensive provinces of Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, the study found a much lower percentage of those who think climate change is 
happening. In addition to regional differences, political party affiliation affected the way 
respondents answered. Respondents who affiliated with the Conservative party were 
significantly less likely than supporters of all the other parties to agree to the overall 
increase in temperatures and global warming.  
 With the question of which level of government should endure the greatest 
responsibility over taking action on climate change, a majority of Canadians (89 percent) 
believe that the federal government has an important role to play in taking action on 
climate change, and should bear the greatest responsibility over this issue. That said, 88 
percent of Canadians acknowledge that the provinces have either some or a great deal 
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of responsibility to take action regarding climate change. Therefore, these results are 
inconsistent with the reality of the situation, in that, the federal government has not taken 
the initiative that is expected of them by the public; it is however, consistent with the 
supporting action taken on behalf of provinces. Canadians are also likely to support 
provincial action on climate change despite neighbouring provinces not doing the same. 
This level of support for provincial action may help to explain the progressive actions by 
some provinces on moving forward on climate change polices, for example BC, with 
their province wide carbon tax. At the time of this survey, federal action on climate 
change policy had been very limited. However, we are beginning to see a shift with the 
federal level involvement in the past year with the recent Liberal government (Harris, 
2016). They have begun to be more engaged in the process, in line with public opinion.  
Ideas and Discourses 
 
 Ideas of the federal government of the day have great implications for action on 
climate change. For a long time in Canada, ideas about climate change have been 
viewed in terms of an economic and energy issue. These ideas about climate change vs 
the economy were prominent under the leadership of the previous Conservative 
governments in Canada.  
 Harper has opposed federal rules on the oil and gas industry unless the U.S. 
imposes regulations as well. In an interview with CBC reporter Peter Mansbridge he said 
“under the current circumstances of the oil and gas sector, it would be crazy economic 
policy to do unilateral penalties on that sector. We’re clearly not going to do it.” Harper 
was also opposed to any sort of carbon tax or carbon pricing scheme, despite numerous 
studies conducted and recommendations made by the National Roundtable on the 
Environment and the Economy (NRTEE). As cited on the NRTEE website, “NRTEE was 
established to bring in a new way we must think of the relationship between the 
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environment and the economy and the new way we must act”. NRTEE was established 
by the Mulroney Government in 1988, and was the only independent arms-length 
advisory committee to the Government of Canada, consisting of expert stakeholders 
from a broad range of backgrounds such as leaders from industry, labor and academe 
who worked at the forefront to bring together environmental sustainability and economic 
prosperity. These multiple perspectives provided a unique opportunity to deal with the 
complexity and interdisciplinary nature involved with sustainable development and 
garner a greater influence on the federal government. Specifically designed to aid in 
moving away from traditional ways of thinking that saw the environment and the 
economy as separate issues, the NRTEE was key to moving forward on policy issues 
such as climate change.  
 In the 2012 federal budget, the Harper government made the decision to eliminate 
NRTEE. According to the federal budget document, the goal to be achieved by the 
elimination of NRTEE is part of a larger plan to reduce the deficit by 2015-2016 
(Archived Budget, 2012). In addition to this “official” reason stated in the budget, in 
considering eliminating the NRTEE, the federal government had consistently been 
opposed to the idea of a carbon tax, which the NRTEE had been recommending, and 
therefore since their interests did not align, the easiest thing to do was to eliminate the 
roundtable altogether. This advice on climate change went against Harper’s ideas about 
the economy and natural resource development. The elimination came after the Minister 
of the Environment; Peter Kent had tasked NRTEE to complete a report assessing 
Canada’s progress on climate change action thus far. The report has been said to be 
one of the most comprehensive studies on where Canada is in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions. The report concluded the country is nowhere near on track towards meeting 
the Harper government’s goal of reducing emissions by 17% by the year 2020 (Simpson, 
2012). Upon elimination of the committee, the Environment Minister demanded that the 
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consent and reports be taken down form the NRTEE website. The NRTEE was the only 
external advisory group on issues of climate change, sustainability and economic policy 
for the federal government (Grandia, 2013). However, to the Harper government it was 
seen as a constraint to the government’s economic interests and Foreign Affairs Minister 
John Baird responded to the advice after eliminating the NRTEE from the budget with: “I 
think the last thing the government needs to pay for is another report encouraging a 
carbon tax when Canadians have spoken up definitively that they do not want a carbon 
tax” (Woods, 2012). 
Since 2006, the Harper government has either eliminated or decreased funding 
for many national networks doing work on climate science. Some of these initiatives 
included closing the Canadian Climate Impacts and Adaptations Research Network, and 
implementing a Media Relations Policy for the Ministry of the Environment. This policy 
banned scientists from being able to directly communicate with media, and that they are 
to answer any questions in writing that have first been examined and approved by senior 
managers in government (Young & Coutinho, 2013). The government also ended 
funding for the Canadians foundation for Climate and Atmospheric Sciences (Eindiguer, 
2010). This shows a general trend under the Harper government of ending funding for 
research into the climate crisis, highlighting Harper’s reluctance to act on climate 
change.  
Conclusions 
 
Hessing, Howlett and Summerville’s (2005) analysis of policy communities and 
networks, helps to explain how concern over the economy has led to a reactive and 
incremental approach to climate policy. The climate policy community is largely divided 
between ideas about the economy and the environment. This influences the discourse 
within which policy options are formulated. Within the climate policy community, various 
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networks exist, such as the federal state, the provinces, industries, interest groups, 
NGOs and environmental groups. The dynamics within these networks can help to 
explain the success or failure of climate change policy in Canada.  
From an institutional context, moving forward on climate change policy has been 
challenging in Canada for various reasons. Jurisdiction over the environment has not 
been clearly divided between the provinces and the federal government. Section 92 
grants provinces the authority to manage non-renewable natural resources, forestry, and 
electric energy (Olive, 2012), however, the federal government holds the power to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada. Ultimately, providing the 
federal government to override provincial powers. The federal government has been 
reluctant to interfere with provincial matters however, due to the varying economies and 
interests of the provinces. Thus, the federal-provincial policy network with regards to 
climate change has markedly lacked coordination. Councils such as the Canadian 
Council of Ministers of the Environment and the Canadian Council of Energy Ministers, 
have attempted to achieve policy coordination. These councils however, operate on a 
basis in which decision-making is consensual. This weakens the ability of the 
institutional system to facilitate negotiated agreements, since any player can veto 
decisions to move forward on climate policy.  
Commitments made by the federal government at the international level, are 
made on a voluntary basis, due to the lack of federal consultation with provinces. 
Although the federal government might have the final say during international 
agreements, it is largely in the hand of the provinces, whether or not those commitments 
will be implemented. Even through the federal government can step in to coordinate and 
address issues pertaining to climate and energy, historically the federal government has 
taken a back seat, due to the strong decentralized federation in which provinces have 
significant power. Therefore, for the sake of avoiding conflict the federal government has 
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preferred not to interfere. This has led to an uncoordinated set of policies and little 
progress has been made.   
In terms of the political economic context, Canada’s natural resources have 
greatly influenced climate change policy in this country. Canada has an abundance of 
natural resources, particularly in the form of energy from bitumen for oil to natural gas. 
Energy policy and climate change policy are closely linked as one implicates the other. 
Canada has struggled with balancing energy and climate policy, especially since, 
Canada’s natural resources are closely linked to the country’s economy. Therefore, 
climate policy has largely been driven by economic factors rather than concern for the 
environment. Particularly the policy network of industry groups has influenced provincial 
and federal governments, since they are equipped with financial resources, and their 
ideas about the economy are in line with that of decision-makers. On the other hand, 
environmental actors such as the Suzuki Foundations and think tanks such as the 
Pembina Institute who are also involved in the policy network, differ from decision-
makers in the way they view the environment and the economy. Therefore, they are less 
likely to influence climate policy. These groups have however, played an important role 
in informing the public on climate and energy issues. Moving forward, with a new Liberal 
government in place, environmental groups might have a more significant role, and more 
influence in the decision making process.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN GERMANY 
Institutional Framework 
Governance Structure 
 
In Germany the government’s structure is a result of the constitution, called the 
Grudgesetz meaning Basic Law. Although Germany’s parliamentary system somewhat 
resembles the British system, the Basic Law created a federal system in which the 
states have a considerable amount of power. This is different from the United Kingdom 
model, which is a unitary system. Germany’s Basic Law sets out the principles of human 
rights and the basis for the government of the people, and outlines the political and legal 
system of Germany. Much like Canada’s constitution, Germany’s Basic Law divides 
powers between the federal and state levels, and between the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches.  
The executive branch consists of the President, the Federal Chancellor and 
his/her Cabinet, which consists of various Ministers. The President is the head of state 
and largely holds a ceremonial role, much like the monarch in the Canadian system. 
Unlike the monarch however, the President is elected for a five-year term, which can 
only be renewed once. The German President does have limited reserved powers, he or 
she nominates the Federal Chancellor for the Bundestag and the Chancellor’s cabinet 
appointments. Although the President cannot dismiss the chancellor, upon the 
chancellor’s request/recommendation he/she is able to dissolve the Bundestag, if for 
example, the Bundestag is not supportive of the Chancellor’s policies. The President is 
also a representative of the country internationally and is involved in concluding 
international treaties. The Federal Chancellor is the head of government, empowered by 
the Basic Law, the Chancellor proposes candidates to the President for his/her Cabinet, 
and works with the Cabinet to determine policies. In order for the Chancellor to be 
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formally appointed by the President, he/she must first be elected by an absolute majority 
of votes in the Bundestag. Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has 
been Federal Chancellor since 2005, she was re-elected in 2013.  
The legislative branch is the German parliament which consists of the elected 
officials known as the Bundestag (similar to the Canadian House of Commons) and the 
appointed Bundesrat (upper House of the German Parliament), also referred to as the 
Federal Council. The Bundestag is elected by German citizens every four years. The 
Bundestag is responsible for enacting and amending legislation, electing the Federal 
Chancellor, approving the federal budget and scrutinizing its implementation by the 
Federal government among other things. The Bundesrat is composed of 69 appointed 
members representing the 16 states of Germany at the national level. The number of 
seats for each state is based on the population of a state, ranging from three to six seats 
per state. The Basic Law has granted the Bundesrat with some legislative and scrutiny 
powers. For example, the Bundesrat makes initial comments on draft law before it is 
submitted to Parliament for scrutiny and vote. The Bundesrat may also veto a bill that 
substantially affects the state interests. Since bills must be approved by both houses to 
become legislation, in cases where agreement cannot be reached, the Basic Law allows 
for covering a mediation committee (The Joint Conference Committee) with 16 members 
of the Bundestag and an equal number of the Bundesrat to resolve the difference 
between the two houses. The judicial branch consists of German’s court system, which 
has two levels comprising the federal and state courts. The Federal Constitutional Court 
is the highest court dealing with constitutional matters.  
Multilevel Governance  
 
Germany is a good example of how multiple levels of government can work 
together to implement policies, from the EU level to the sub national level. As a federal 
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state, Germany shares legislative power with the 16 federal states, referred to as 
Lander. As previously mentioned, the Basic Law establishes legislative power for the 
Federal government and the 16 states (Neumann, 1996). It is the responsibility of the 
Lander to implement federal legislation under Article 83 of the Basic Law. The Lander 
are, however, represented at the federal level through the Bundesrat, which is made up 
of representatives from sub-national governments (Neumann, 1996). Legislation that is 
proposed by the Bundestag, requires the consent of the Bundesrat under Article 77 and 
78 of the Basic Law (Neumann, 1996). This helps to ensure that the interests of the 
Lander are represented at the federal level. Generally, the Basic Law allows for overlap 
between the federal and state government, since under Article 71, in areas where the 
federal government has exclusive legislative power, they can extend this power to the 
Lander through the federal act if they chose to do so. Also, areas of “concurrent” 
legislative power under Article 22 in the Basic law grant powers to the Lander, only if the 
Federation has not exercised its legislative power. Although the Basic Law does not 
specifically set out legislation on matters pertaining to environmental protection, it does 
however mention matters related to air pollution control, waste management, nature 
conservation and water supply (Nachmany et al., 2015). These matters related to the 
environment are under concurrent legislative power. This transboundary nature of 
legislative responsibility between the two levels of government contributes to a 
cooperative relationship when implementing legislation (Neumann, 1996).  
The Lander have a reputation for working closely with the federal government on 
issues of climate change. The subnational governments each have a comprehensive 
climate protection plan, in which they have implemented legislation required by the 
federal government. The Lander have influence on national climate policy through 
establishing their own GHG emissions reduction measures (in addition to national 
measures), and they are also able to use their veto power in the Bundesrat (lower 
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house), for instances in which they disagree with federal government initiatives. As 
mentioned above the Bundesrat is representative of the Lander, providing an area at the 
federal level for their concerns to be heard (Jenicke, 2010). In cases where the 
Bundesrat are not happy with a bill that is being introduced by the Bundestag, there is a 
mediation committee which is comprised by equal members of both chambers, that 
helps to resolve any differences over legislation (Nachmany et al., 2015).  
Beyond national governance, Germany is in a unique position, in that its 
governance structure falls within the European Union (EU). The EU is made up of the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union. The role of the Commission is generally to “elaborate the drafts for pieces of 
legislation of the EU regulations, directives or decisions - and enter them into the EU 
legislation process” (Federal government, 2017). The Council of the EU represents the 
governments of the Member States, and has the final say in the EU decision-making 
process, however, the European Parliament can share equal powers with the council in 
certain political areas. 
Germany has been known to be a very active player in the EU, often times 
becoming involved in legislation proposed by the Commission before initial deliberations 
are taken up by the Council. Germany is able to receive early warning signs of incoming 
European policy proposals through the Permanent Representation of Germany to the 
EU, which acts as a German embassy with the EU. Those that work in the Permanent 
Representation inform federal ministries of the plans that are underway by the EU 
Commission at an early stage. This puts the federal government in a good position to 
determine an appropriate negotiating strategy early on. When legislation has reached 
the decision-making phase, the German federal ministry involved with the particular topic 
of the legislation represents the federal government in Brussels (EU headquarters), and 
pushes a common position of the entire Federal government in negotiations at the EU 
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level. When differences between ministries arise, there are special boards that step in, 
such as the European Affairs Officers, who meet on an ad hoc basis to discuss 
European political affairs. There is also the round table of the European Affairs 
Directors-General of the federal ministries (headed by the Federal Foreign Office and 
the Federal Minister of Economics), who directly report to the secretary of the state, and 
provide a basis for co-ordination between ministries as well. In addition to this, the 
Federal Chancellery, which is an agency that serves the executive office of the 
Chancellor, is involved with the coordination of state and European affairs. The Director 
General of European Affairs within the Chancellery is the closest political advisor to the 
Chancellor on policy concerning EU.  
In implementing European acts in Germany, any directives and regulations that 
are made at the EU level, must be applied. EU regulations are binding and therefore 
member states are required by law to apply them, whereas directives, while also 
intended for Member States to implement, are not legally binding. There is however a 
fine for non-complying members, or if directives are not implemented within a certain 
time period (The federal government, 2017). Since Germany is a federal state, and 
legislative powers are divided among the federal level and the Lander, EU policies which 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Lander, are handled by the Lander or they have 
indirect input through the Bundesrat. However, since representation of Germany to the 
EU is within the federal government, any matter that does get assigned to the Lander, 
will go through the federal government, at which point they will have a say as to what 
gets transferred to the EU. Therefore, it is through the Bundesrat that the Lander have a 
say in European affairs, and it is the responsibility of the federal government to ensure 
that the Bundesrat are informed on any plans at the EU level, as soon as they are made 
aware of them. In addition to this however, the Lander do have representation offices in 
Brussels, which provides them with direct access to EU bodies and are able to represent 
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their interests. Another way in which they can provide their influence is through the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR), which is an advisory committee of the EU that 
represents local and regional authorities.  
Analysis 
 
This section will analyze the above mentioned institutional factors specifically 
with respect to climate change. Federalism in Germany has not placed a significant 
barrier towards climate change policy as it has in Canada. This is however due to the 
fact that Germany’s constitution ultimately gives power over environmental legislation to 
the federal level. Therefore it is up to the federal level to create legislation and policies 
related to combating climate change, and it is the role of the lander to administer those 
policies. The Lander however, have autonomy in the way that the policies and legislation 
are administered, and therefore they have some autonomy in terms of setting GHG 
reduction targets. Generally, it does seem like in Germany there is more of a top down 
approach to climate change policy, which has not proved to be difficult, since the 
subnational governments have been quite accepting of the federal government’s policies 
(Weidner and Mez, 2008). In addition to this the Lander and Federal government have a 
platform on which they are able to work together to outline climate targets, this is aided 
for example by the biennial Conference of Environmental Ministers and central state 
government working groups (Weidner and Mez, 2008), and has fostered a cooperative 
relationship between the two levels of government.  
At the EU level, Germany’s position on climate change aligns with that of the EU 
(Michaelowa, 2008). Both are progressive and determined to move forward on climate 
change policy. In fact, Germany has generally been a leader on climate change policy, 
often times encouraging ambitious reduction targets, and playing a key role in 
convincing less climate-policy minded member states to accept EU policies (Janicke, 
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2010). One of the most important initiatives aiming at combating climate change 
originated from the EU level, which was the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). As a 
result of the EU ETS Germany introduced its national allocation plan (NAP) for 2005-07. 
Germany was hesitant towards this initiative due to the negative response received from 
the automobile industry and energy producers, and so the NAP was fairly weak and 
favoured specific industries. The second NAP from 2008-2012 did not improve on the 
weaknesses of the previous plan, however, the EU Commission was able to step in and 
enforce the original climate policy targets set out for the ETS (Weidner and Mez, 2008; 
Janicke, 2010). The fact that Germany held the presidency for the EU in the first half of 
2007 and the G8 presidency during 2007, also helped foster a political leadership role in 
international climate change. Therefore the EU plays a key role in keeping Germany, in 
line towards meeting climate change policy targets.  
The first ministry for the environment was established in 1986, only after the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, which demonstrated the need for environmental policy 
coordination at the federal level. This ministry was called “Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety”. This ministry is responsible for 
positioning the objectives and instruments of environmental policy followed by 
implementation of that policy (Neuman, 1996). 
In 1986, after an influential magazine Der Spiegel published an article called ‘the 
Climate Disaster’ The Bundesrat (upper house) launched an initiative to create an 
advisory board for climate policy. This new issue of climate change was then put on the 
political agenda in 1987, when the Bundestag (lower house) set up an enquiry 
commissions called ‘Enquette Commission’ “Preventative Measures to Protect the 
Earth’s atmosphere”. The Enquette Commission was quite influential, in creating a 
‘knowledge-base’ for understanding climate change and providing potential policy 
solutions for politicians and the public. The Commission had ambitious carbon dioxide 
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emission reduction targets (30% reduction by 2005), and helped to push Germany into a 
leadership role. By the time of the first Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC in 
Berlin (1995), Germany put forward a carbon dioxide reduction target of 25% by 2005 
(compared to 1990 levels) (Janicke, 2010). This set the stage for the government of the 
time to introduce the ‘CO2 Reduction Programme’ and set up the ‘Interministerial 
Committee on CO2 Reduction’ (IMA) which encouraged Ministries that were so used to 
working independently to work together (Michaelowa, 2008; Janicke, 2010). Further, 
Germany went on to ratify the UNFCCC as early on as 1993, and in 1997 continued with 
ambitious target of 21% reduction target for GHG emissions under the 1997 Kyoto 
climate change protocol.  
Germany’s federal structure and electoral system of proportional representation 
really helped to foster the rise of the Green Party. Once a party receives 5% of the total 
vote, that party achieves representation in parliament. In addition to easy access to 
political representation, German federalism and the electoral system promotes 
cooperation. Proportional representation makes it difficult for a single party to gain 
enough seats to form a majority government on its own, therefore coalition governments 
are a key feature of Germany’s political system. This system of coalition governments 
fosters consensus politics and encourages negotiation between all levels of government 
(Weidner and Mez, 2008). This has strongly influenced Germany’s policy making style in 
the areas of climate change. In fact, between 1998-2005 the coalition government of the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Green Party led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, also 
referred to as the Red-Green Government, played an important role in making climate 
change a key priority for Germany. In particular, due to the unification of East and West 
Germany, economic issues had begun to rise, therefore shifting priorities. The Red-
Green government however, listed climate policy as “Ecological Modernization" in the 
coalition treaty between the parties (Jenkins, 2010). The red-green government also 
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introduced the Renewable Energy Act in 1999, which helped to increase the obligatory 
tariffs to a level at which green power could grow at a faster rate. This coalition also set 
up the Climate Protection Programme in 2000, which introduced regulations and sectoral 
emission reduction objectives up to 2005, providing a basis for more ambitious climate 
policies.  
Subsequently, the Grand coalition government of the Christian Democratic Party 
(CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, continued on 
the leadership of climate change policy. They helped to evolve the previous 
government’s concept of ‘ecological modernization’ to ‘ecological industrial policy’ 
focusing more on the industrial policy side of the problem. It was under this government 
that the national allocation plan was introduced (NAP) and the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme, was thought up in 2007 in Meseberg with a 40 percent GHG 
emission reduction target for 2020 (compared to 1990 levels) (Janicke, 2010). After the 
2009 elections, although there was a change in the coalition, Angela Merkel remained 
Chancellor and German climate policy remains a top priority. Under this new coalition 
the Environment Minister Norbert Rotten of the CDU, emphasized their desire to being 
the most modern national economy when it comes to environmental policy (Janicke, 
2010).  
International legal and political cooperation over the environment is just as 
important as national-level environmental legislation. Germany has signed and ratified a 
number of multinational treaties under the United Nations. For example, the Convention 
on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, 1979, along with its follow-up 
protocols: Geneva, 1984, concerning financing and monitoring; Helsinki, 1985, 
concerning the reduction of sulphur emissions; Sofia, 1988, concerning nitrogen oxides 
emissions control; and Geneva, 1991, concerning the control of VOC emissions. 
Germany has also signed and ratified the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
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Ozone Layer, 1985, along with subsequent Montreal Protocol, 1987, and the 
amendments to the Vienna Convention of London, 1990 and Copenhagen, 1992. And 
most directly relevant to climate change, Germany has signed and ratified the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992.  
Political Economic Factors  
 
The political economic context of climate change policy in Germany helps to 
further explain the relative success of institutions to reach a coordinated policy for the 
country. Some regional tensions do exist; however, there is not the same level of 
separatism and decentralized federalism that exists in Canada, in terms of agreeing 
upon climate action. In Germany, the Lander have their own constitutions, parliamentary 
system of government, and their own administration. As mentioned above, jurisdiction 
over the environment is shared between the national government and the Lander, and 
therefore, the Lander and the federal government have to coordinate policy 
development, before the Lander parliaments can take legislative action.   
Germany is a highly industrialized country with high GHG emissions compared to 
other EU countries. Much of Germany’s emissions are the result of the energy industry. 
It is important to look at Germany’s energy sector, as it is one of the major sectors 
contributing to the increase in GHGs and as a result, has a significant role to play in 
climate change policy. Germany’s energy story has been an interesting one. Germany 
has been going through an energy transition, referred to as energiewende. The goal of 
the energy transition is to phase out nuclear sources of power, reduce the dependency 
on imported sources and to lower carbon emissions. The rationale for energy transition 
came about due to the oil crisis of the 1970s and the nuclear disaster that occurred in 
Chernobyl. It was after the Chernobyl accident in particular, that there was a strong 
desire to transition. These events in conjunction with increased concerns over climate 
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change, and the country’s commitments to reduce GHG emissions by 40% of 1990 
levels by 2020, really pushed the energy transition agenda. The official goal of the 
energy transition is to reduce GHG emissions to 80-90% of 1990 levels by 2050, and 
phase out nuclear by 2022. The challenge that Germany faces with this transition 
however, is moving away from carbon-intensive coal as a source of energy.  
Germany has a vast amount of coal reserves, and as of 2015 Germany’s gross 
electricity generation of coal was 44%; 33% came from renewables, 15% from nuclear, 
10% from natural gas, and 1% from mineral oil (Hoff, 2016). From the electricity that is 
produced from coal, 18% was from hard coal which is mainly imported, and 26% came 
from lignite. The use of hard coal has declined, but lignite remains a predominate from of 
energy due to the vast amount of lignite available in Germany. Lignite produces more 
carbon dioxide than hard coal, but transition from lignite has been a challenge since 
Germany is a leading producer of lignite, and it is one of the cheapest fossil fuels. In 
addition to this, the phase out of nuclear reactors since Chernobyl has created a 
demand for which coal was used to meet.  
Despite a heavy reliance on coal, Germany’s energy transition has experienced 
success in increasing its renewable energy supply. Unlike in Canada, Germany’s natural 
resources are not solely within the jurisdiction of the subnational governments. Instead 
jurisdiction of resources and the environment is shared by the federal government and 
the Lander. Where it is mainly up to the federal government to initiate policies and it is 
up to the Lander to administer those policies. The Lander do get autonomy over how 
they choose to implement/achieve the policies set out by the federal government. One 
law in particular has considerably contributed to the increase in the share of renewable 
energy in Germany: the Feed-in Tariff. This new bill introduced in 1991 made it possible 
for producers of renewable electricity to feed into the grid, and utilities were required to 
pay them a “feed-in tariff” (Macdonald et al., 2014). This helped to accelerate wind 
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energy generation, particularly in the windy northern states. Later, another law to 
accelerate renewable energy sources took effect in 2000, and it ensured that only once 
renewable energy sources were exhausted on the grid, that other sources could be 
used.  
Progress on the renewable energy sector has come about despite some 
tensions. In particular, at the federal level political economic tensions exist between the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economy and Energy. The lead competency 
for climate change has been granted to the Ministry of Environment, however, the 
Ministry of Economy and Energy, holds the lead competency for energy. Since energy 
activities can greatly influence GHG emission reduction targets, the Ministry of 
Environment must work with the Ministry of Economy to achieve results (MacDonald, 
2013). That said, the role of the Ministry of Environment has strengthened. For example, 
in 2002 renewable energy became a core responsibility of the Ministry of Environment. 
In addition to this, the administration of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the 
responsibility of the Environmental Federal Agency which is an arms-length agency of 
the Ministry of the Environment (MacDonald, 2013). The Ministry of Economy and 
Energy has close ties with the conventional energy sector, and therefore work to protect 
their interests, and protect their main energy resource: lignite. However, due to largely, 
institutional constraints such as a strengthened Environment Ministry, and the presence 
of the inter-ministerial working group, along with the political will to support renewable 
energy, the Ministry of Economy has not been very successful in their pushback of 
renewables.  
At the sub-national level, tensions between the Lander are fairly low since there 
is not the same level of decentralization/separatism that is experienced in Canada. As 
previously mentioned, the Federal government has significant legislative powers in 
German climate and energy policy; the states however, can influence federal policy 
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through the federal legislative process. As a result, they are able to protect their regional 
economic development (Weidner and Eberlein, 2009). In some cases Lander are able to 
intervene and influence federal level policy/legislation. Since it is up to the Lander to 
implement and execute federal level policies, they enjoy a considerable amount of 
autonomy with administering policies. In terms of climate change policy, there has been 
little resistance on the part of the Lander. The federal government has put in place GHG 
emissions reduction measures based on suggested allocation of cost among sector and 
sub-national governments. Here it is important to note that the “reduction cost differential 
between highest and lowest per capita Lander is much less than between highest and 
lowers per capita costs of Canadian provinces” (MacDonald, 2014).  
There is general agreement amongst all Lander that action on climate change is 
needed, and to do that an energy transition is required. In addition to the national climate 
policies all the Lander have their own climate change plans and activities. Despite, there 
being no formal obligation, all Lander, besides Lower Saxony have a climate protection 
plan in place. With respect to energy-related policy, the Lander exercise an important 
role through land use planning. The Lander have official development programs of 
spatial planning. As a result, this can have a significant impact on climate mitigation 
policy with respect to approval procedures of power plants and destination of areas for 
purposes of renewable energy, such as placement of wind power.  
The Lander have generally been supportive of renewable energy policies, as 
they saw the potential to strengthen regional economies, and therefore sought economic 
interest in seeing federal action for promotion of renewable energy. In addition to federal 
climate policies, as mentioned above, Lander establish their own programs and plans, 
often updating their programs along with federal level changes. For example, in 2007 
with the federal Integrated Energy and Climate program, nearly all the Lander (15 of 16) 
established quite ambitious targets and measures. The Lander also support their 
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regional economies through establishing regional platforms, providing a space for 
cooperation between economy and state actors to bring forward innovations. Therefore, 
in Germany allocation is not only seen as an issue of cost, but also as allocation of job 
creation and wealth through the development of new renewable energy technologies, 
and therefore seen as a benefit.  
Although, conflict between Lander in Germany is not as great as in Canada, 
there has been some conflict at the Lander level. For example, in implementing the 
Feed-in Tariff program, utilities faced differing costs depending on the amount of 
renewable energy that was produced within their region. For example, in the maritime 
regions (especially Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstien), which produces/experiences 
much more growth in wind power, utilities faced higher reimbursement costs in those 
Lander (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). This consequently led to different electricity 
prices between the Lander, and resulted in competitive problems for energy intensive 
industries in the higher priced regions. This issue was addressed however by the 
Renewable Energy Act of 2000, through the nation-wide equalization scheme designed 
to ensure equal allocation of reimbursement charges. The utilities had pooled their 
revenues and subsidies, which removed electricity price differences between the Lander. 
In this situation, the federal government was able to step in to help address the 
distributive conflict among the Lander.  
In addition to this, there was an apparent north-south divide in terms of 
renewable energy capacity (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). There were many more 
renewable energy plants built in the north compared to the south. The problem here was 
that under the Feed-in Tariff Act of 1991, electricity generators for renewable sources 
had to pay a subsidy. As a result, utilities in Lander that had many renewable source 
plants faced higher costs; this was in turn reflected in the price of electricity for the 
region. This problem was also addressed by the federal government with the Renewable 
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Energy Act, 2000, through aggregating the total feed-in tariff, and the cost distributed 
among utilities in proportion to total sales. In this case the federal government was able 
to step in, to make the cost of climate policy more equitable among the Lander.  
Another situation in which Lander interests surfaced in relation to climate change 
policy is in relation to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Concern over the ETS 
which, originated at the EU level came about mainly by the energy intensive regions. 
Germany tried to block the ETS system during the decision-making phase. Lander that 
were to face higher costs as a result of the system, for example, those with a high share 
of coal production and energy insensitive industry were the most active in the decision-
making process, in order to protect their interests. North Rhine-Westphalia in particular 
was active throughout this process, with attempts to ensure a common position amongst 
all the Lander, but failed to block the mandatory EU ETS due to Germany’s strong 
leadership of the federal government at the EU level on climate change. Once the ETS 
has become mandatory, the Lander faced conflict with the federal government over the 
level of administrative responsibility of the ETS. Again, only the regions with heavy 
energy intensive industry were interested in administration of the system, whereas, the 
remaining Lander did not have the means/resources to administer the system and 
therefore, did not oppose administration by the federal government (Macdonald et al., 
2014). As a result, the larger, energy intensive Lander could not convince the smaller 
Lander and so they were not able to gain a majority in the Bundesrat, and the 
administration of the ETS stayed with the federal government. Thus the federal 
government was able to ensure equal treatment of electricity plants, independent of 
regional economic or political interests.  
Although, there has been general agreement on climate policy targets and goals, 
as well as on the need to transition to renewable energy sources in support of climate 
mitigation, the challenge that remains between the Lander is now related to the 
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development of effective network infrastructure for new and additional renewable energy 
sources. Different geographic, economic and demographic structures sometimes result 
in strategies that are not aligned. In the transition to renewable energy, Lander are 
motivated by competing for private investments, more tax revenue, distribution of returns 
and regional added value by developing renewable electricity generation (Ohlhorst, 
2016). Due to differing economic and geographic structures, regional renewable energy 
priorities and strategies differ from one another. As a result, there is a risk for increased 
inefficiencies and costs, in particular, in relation to spatial distribution effects and the 
development of energy grids. The Lander have authority over regional, spatial and land 
use planning and therefore, decide which areas are to be designated for renewable 
energy activities. In this respect, a north-south divide can be observed.  
All 16 regional states have their own targets for the share of renewable energy by 
2021, and some are more ambitious than others. For example, Schleswig-Holstein, 
located in northern Germany has great wind power potential, and has a goal to produce 
three to four times the state’s electricity consumption from renewables by 2020, and 
ideally would like to be a major exporter of renewable energy. The state of Mecklenburg 
Western Pomerania, also in northern Germany, has a high capacity for renewables from 
between eleven to fifteen gigawatts whereas, the state’s consumption is only 1.1 
gigawatts. This state will also look into exporting their excess renewable power. The 
surplus of electricity that will be generated will require the expansion of electricity 
networks, in order to transport excess power from the north to the south. Expansion of 
grids is a lengthy process that requires planning and approval procedures, and it is 
important to keep in mind Lander will likely act in their own economic interests when 
considering such grids. For example, the state of Bavaria which is located in south 
eastern Germany plans to meet its energy demand using resources from its own 
territory, such as domestic biogas, photovoltaic, and geothermal power. These plans do 
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not include imported wind power from the north. As a result, Bavaria has opposed the 
construction of a power line from Saxony-Anhalt from the north to Bavaria in the south 
(Ohlhorst, 2016). They have placed a moratorium on the line, and the Federal Minister of 
Economy and Energy considered the line unfeasible due to the resistance from Bavaria, 
and potential legal disputes that would arise. This shows that even though Lander do not 
have formal veto powers they can still influence federal level policy.  
At the moment, the renewable energy plans by the regions are not legally 
binding. They are more like guidelines, but given the heterogeneous nature of plans 
across Lander, they do not align with the national targets for share of renewable energy 
in the countries energy mix and goals of optimized, secure, and affordable power supply. 
In addition to this, the federal government does not have authority over planning 
instruments and therefore is unable to intervene and align the system from a top-down 
approach. There is a lack of procedures to negotiate the alignment of different regional 
interests (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). This is the challenge that Germany now faces 
and must overcome in order to continue its leadership role on climate change policy.  
Societal Factors 
Interest Groups and Non State Actors 
 
Interest groups and non-state actors are quite integrated within the German 
political system and can hold a great amount of influence. Germany has had a strong 
environmental movement, which began fairly early (Markham, 2008; Weidner and Mez, 
2008). Two events in particular sparked the mobilization of environmental groups. The 
first was the oil crisis of the 1970s. The oil crises drew attention to Germany’s reliance 
on foreign oil and thus, coal (one of Germany’s most abundant natural resources) began 
to be more heavily used. This resulted in concerns of air pollution and acid rain, as a 
result of emissions from coal plants. The second event that took place was the 
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Chernobyl disaster which was a catastrophic nuclear accident that occurred in 1986 in 
Ukraine. This disaster left parts of Germany with the fear of exposure to radiation which 
led to precautions such as the closure of schools. These precautions concerned the 
public and consequently people felt that more needed to be done. The German anti-
nuclear movement gained considerable momentum, and massive demonstrations were 
held to stop new reactors and to close existing ones. These two events helped to 
mobilize an environmental movement early on, and in 1977 green groups began to 
participate as “green lists” in elections which, helped to spur representatives of green 
parties in state parliaments, and eventually in the national parliament in 1983. During the 
years in which the Green Party was just beginning to form, environmental issues 
triggered great conflict that sometimes became violent. Since this time however, thanks 
to green groups, environmental interests started to integrate in established institutions 
and processes, as heads of environmental agencies and even ministers. The level of 
organization of the green movement and its willingness to cooperate has really helped to 
shape the cooperative nature of climate policy that was beginning to form in the 80s. The 
sum of the events also led to massive support for renewable energy. 
Some of the dominant NGOs involved in the climate change politics network are 
Greenpeace Germany, BUND and NABU (Jost and Jacob, 2004). Although 
environmental NGOs make up a small portion of the climate policy network, these 
groups have been quite influential despite minimal financial and human resources. The 
influence of NGOs on climate policy can be observed during the implementation of the 
eco-tax in the early 90s. Lobbying on the part of Greenpeace helped the eco-tax issue to 
gain momentum after 1994, therefore, Jost and Jacob (2004) argue that rather than 
financial and human resources, expertise and closeness to the government might 
actually be more important factors in influencing climate policy. As green groups were 
becoming institutionalized, environmental NGOs were able to leverage existing 
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relationships they had with individuals who were formerly part of environmental groups, 
and were now political figures/involved in governmental organizations representing 
environmental protection. In addition to integrating into the political realm through their 
green group counterparts, NGOs have also leveraged mass media as well as mass 
rallies in order to reach and influence the general public. Leveraging these activities has 
helped NGOs to compensate for their minimum human and financial resources. Since 
mobilizing the general public creates awareness, sparks citizens movements, and 
impacts voting, all of these things affect climate policy. Environmental NGOs have also 
been good at forming coalitions with research institutes and acquiring/relying on a large 
information base to gain credibility and influence. Jost and Jacob (2004) find that NGOs 
and governmental units have a stronger relationship than governments have with other 
interest groups, which is likely the result of the change in government in 1998. 
In addition to Environmental NGOs, economic interests do exist. For example, 
the Association of the Car Producing Industries, insurance, and the Association of 
Lignite Industries. These groups were unable to influence government on their position 
of being against the Eco-tax in the 90s, likely due to the strong environmental concern at 
the time. Although when introducing the EU ETS, coal interest groups lobbied against 
the ETS, and were able to influence the federal government. They weren’t able to 
influence them to ban the ETS, which is what they had hoped for, but the federal 
government set very weak targets in the interest of the coal industry, and other emission 
intensive industries. In this situation however, the EU was able to step in and force the 
federal government to set appropriate targets originally agreed upon. 
Media 
 
In Germany, the media has played an important role in influencing climate policy, 
by reporting on the science of climate change and influencing/informing the public from 
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an early time. From as early as 1986, climate change appeared in the media, as a 
statement that was issued by the German Physics Society – a prestigious study group 
on energy related issues. With the main purpose of supporting nuclear power, they 
issued a statement warming the public about climate catastrophe. Unfortunately, for the 
group, the Chernobyl disaster took place shortly after they issued the statement, and 
concern about nuclear power took precedent. In 1989 however, the news magazine Der 
Spiegel published an article called ‘The Climate Disaster’ and began a series on the 
issue of climate, featuring covers showing natural disasters such as floods at the 
symbolic Cologne Cathedral in Germany (Janicke, 2010). 
Since this time, reporting on environment and climate has increased, and in 
particular publicly funded media has increased in quality, range and importance. 
Reporting of climate change reached a peak in Germany in 2007, triggered by the 
publication of the Stern report by the UK treasury in October 2006, the first volume of the 
fourth IPCC report in February 2008 and the subsequent volumes for the remainder of 
the year. In fact, the day after the publication of the first volume of the fourth IPCC 
report, a tabloid that is not particularly known to be in favour of environmental issues, 
called “Bid” released an issue with the headline “Our Planet Is Dying” (Peters and 
Heinriches, 2008). Furthermore, the German news magazine called “Stern” changed the 
colour of its red logo to green and published an article “This Is How We Can Save the 
Climate and Still Enjoy Life.” Beyond print media, even television programs began to 
spread the message. For example, a science program called “Calileo” started a series in 
which they provided viewers with tips on how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
Around this time, there were also media outlets criticizing the alarm over climate change. 
In fact, even the Influential magazine Der Spiegel published an article called “Not the 
End of the World as We Know it” which questioned the severity of climate change. But 
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still, the media response to climate research prevailed and helped to spread the 
knowledge that was being learned about climate change at its early stages. 
Public Opinion 
 
It is beneficial to understand the public opinion of citizens and how they perceive 
climate change, because it is an important factor to understanding how decision makers 
operate and act on climate policies. Depending on how the public view climate change, 
political, economic and social action to address the issue might be constrained or may 
flourish. In Germany, the public is in general agreement that the issue of climate change 
exists and that it needs to be addressed. There is not much debate over the topic. As 
discussed above, the Chernobyl disaster and the oil crises of the 70s and linkages to air 
pollution, sparked concern for environmental issues by the general public, therefore from 
and early stage, the public was aware of environmental issues. In 1993 Health of the 
Planet survey 73% of German’s believed in global warming to be a very serious issue, 
21% said they believed it was a serious issue (Brechin, 2003). The high public attention 
to climate change can be attributed to the extensive coverage of global warming since 
the 1980s. The high attention paid to climate change during the late and early 90s given 
in the media can be responsible for the generally high knowledge/concern of climate 
change by the general public. Media had done a good job at tailoring their publications, 
using scientific findings to peak the interest of the public, for example, by relating the 
issue to everyday experiences, and framing it in a way that would be directly relevant to 
the audience, for example, by talking about our grandchildren, the effect on various 
regions (effect on ski tourism), etc. Also, media made public aware how their everyday 
activities can affect climate change. As a result public opinion on climate change has 
been to take action, and this is clear in the support that was received by the Green Party 
in 1998. 
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Ideas and Discourses  
 
In Germany, the ideas surrounding climate change have been prominent, and 
taking action on climate change has been viewed as necessary. In fact, climate change 
in Germany has come a long way and is largely embedded in the institutional context, 
and has become an “object of routine political regulation” (Weidner and Mez, 2008). 
Climate change entered into the political arena at an early stage sparked by scientific 
publications highlighting the affect carbon dioxide was having on the atmosphere. At this 
early stage in the late 1970s the urgency/reaction to the publications was quite low. After 
the World Climate Conference that was held in 1979, the German government planned 
for a national climate research program but, didn’t launch the program until 1984, under 
the Ministry of Science and Technology, displaying the relatively little urgency for the 
matter during the 70s. It was after the increased media attention, and the framing of the 
issue in terms of a “catastrophe”, the German government began to take up the issue 
seriously, despite the presence of scientific uncertainty. The climate catastrophe 
discourse would shape the ideas around climate change in the coming years.  
The Enquette commission also played a key role in framing the urgency of the 
issue, and eventually, it was simply the scientific warming that was enough for the 
German government to begin to take action and in 1990 a commitment to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by 25% was made. Parliamentary debates did not include climate 
skeptics or those that doubted the threat that climate change posed (Weingart, 2000). 
The focus on climate change soon shifted on how to implement carbon dioxide reduction 
targets, and once the German government realized the complexities of the task, and the 
fact that the emission reductions experienced thus far had been a result of de-
industrialization of the former East Germany, the political legitimacy of the German 
government was at stake, since they had emphasized the urgency of the issue. 
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Therefore, the federal government shifted its strategy, and instead of perceiving it as a 
meta problem, they spoke about it in less dramatic terms, and labelled it as part of a 
larger problem of sustainable development. Therefore climate change has entered into 
the scope of various ministries beyond just the Ministry of Environment. Establishing 
climate change across the ministries shows the willingness and seriousness of the 
German government to address the issue.  
Around this time the air pollution problem had entered into the political realm, as 
public concern for the issue was high, calling for air pollution control measures in the 
80s. It was this issue that accelerated the development of environmental management, 
and scientific and technical capacities. This experience in implementing air pollution 
control measures in Germany shaped the ideas around environmental policy. For 
example, for the first time the precautionary principle was used as a justification for 
stronger air pollution control policies. This is important in terms of climate change 
because it promotes the idea of having a risk adverse strategy as the best option in 
times of uncertainty. Although there was concern over the potential detrimental 
economic effects that air pollution control policies would have, mainly from the industrial 
sector and their counterparts in government, there were actually economic benefits to be 
experienced through employment, technological innovation and modernization of 
industry. As a result, a general acceptance of the idea of “ecological modernization” of 
industry emerged as a strategy for receiving environmental as well as economic 
benefits. Therefore, since the introduction of the air pollution control policies came with 
such success, there was little skepticism when the climate change debate surfaced 
(Weidner and Mez, 2008).  
As we can see Germany’s leaders have generally shown concern for 
environmental issues, especially climate change for a long time. In particular, Chancellor 
of the Social Democracy Party, Willy Brandt began development of environmental policy 
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in the early 1970s, under his position of major reform and promotion of democracy. He 
established the first environmental programme in 1971, and passed laws for air pollution 
regulation (Janicke, 2010). His ideas on climate policy and concern for the environment 
can also be seen within the Brandt report, in which he called for renewable energy to be 
used in developing countries in 1980 (Wiedner and Mez, 2008). This report sparked 
discussions around renewable energy at the international stage for the first time at a UN 
conference in Nairobi in 1981 (Hirschl, 2009). Although nothing was achieved in terms of 
climate policy his ideas played a role in setting the context for climate policies. German 
Chancellors that followed, all emphasized the importance of environmental policies and 
contributed positively to climate policy in some way, working towards moving forward on 
the issue.  
In the 1980s as green groups began to form and enter into the political arena, 
Helmont Kohl was Chancellor under the conservative party. Under his conservative-
liberal coalition, he established the Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety in 1986, demonstrating his commitment to the environment, 
particularly in the wake of nuclear disaster. Soon after this, Kohl announced that the 
climate issue was among the world’s most pressing environmental problems” (Wiedner 
and Mez, 2008). In 1987 the special parliamentary committee of investigation on 
“precautions for the protection of the atmosphere” was set up from 1987 to 1990, and 
extended from 1990 to 1994, to provide recommendations on how to deal with climate 
change. Kohl took these science-based recommendations into consideration and 
committed to a target of 25% reduction of GHG emissions of 1990 levels by 2005. Kohl 
was also known for introducing the first Feed-in law in Germany which sparked a 
dialogue of the benefits of going green in the energy sector.    
Subsequently, in 1998 under a social democratic and green coalition, Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder introduced the Renewable Energy Sources Act, 2000; this showed his 
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commitment to reducing GHG emissions. Schröder understand that beyond national 
action, even more important was global action since, and worked towards providing 
assistance to developing countries to provide them with a chance to develop sustainable 
energy strategies (Schröder, 2002). In 2005, as Angela Merkel became Chancellor of 
Germany, the discourse on global action and environmental leadership remained and 
continues to this day. Angela Merkel played a key role in the negotiations that led to the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997, as Environment Minister during that time. Her commitment to 
climate change was also seen at the EU level, when Germany held the EU presidency, 
pushing forward a package of climate targets for 2020. Merkel acknowledges the 
challenge that climate change brings, but is in the view that if we do not address it, the 
damage will be far worse. As Germany holds the G20 presidency for 2017, Merkel also 
plans to make climate change a top priority of discussion at the G20 Hamburg summit 
(G20 Agenda, 2017).  
Ultimately, due to the existing discourses on climate change from an early stage, 
regardless of political party affiliation, the ideas around environmental conservation and 
the concept of the precautionary principle, have really helped to shape the way in which 
German leaders have felt about and acted on climate change policy.   
Conclusions 
 
 The climate policy community in Germany has been much less divided than in 
Canada. The network of actors that have close access to the policy process are largely 
in agreement that action on climate change must take place. Jurisdiction of resources 
and the environment are shared by the federal and sub-national levels, as laid out by the 
Basic Law. However, it is mainly up to the federal level to initiate policies and the sub-
national level to implement them. Beyond federal and sub-national level actors, the EU is 
also involved in the climate policy network in Germany. The EU sets emissions reduction 
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targets in the international arena, and as a member of the EU Germany must apply 
abide by these targets. EU regulations are binding and therefore member states are 
required by law to apply them.  
Tensions between sub-national governments in Germany are fairly low since 
there is not the same level decentralization/separatism that is experienced in Canada. 
There has been some conflict at the Lander level, in terms of implementing renewable 
energy policies fairly. However, the federal government has been able to step in to 
address distributive conflicts and the cost equity of implementing renewable energy 
policies among the Lander. 
Interest groups and non-state actors are quite integrated within the German 
climate policy network and can hold a great amount of influence. Germany’s strong 
environmental movement, which was fueled by the oil crisis of the 70’s, Chernobyl, and 
concerns over air pollution have fueled the rise of green groups in this country. Green 
groups were quite organized and able to establish themselves within institutions, as 
heads of environmental agencies, and even as ministers. With this level of organization, 
and with a proportional representative electoral system, the Green Party was able to 
gain strength and has become a key player in the political system. In addition to 
environmental groups, industry groups have also been able to influence the federal 
government. Particularly, coal interest groups that lobbied against the ETS were 
successful in persuading the government to weaken their targets, however in this 
situation the EU was able to step in and force the federal government to set to 
appropriate agreed upon targets.  
In general, the climate policy community and networks in Germany have viewed 
taking action on climate change as a necessity and has largely been embedded in the 
institutional context and become routine. In Canada where the climate policy issue has 
been framed as an issue of the environment versus the economy, in Germany, actors 
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can see the potential economic benefits that can be had with transitioning to renewable 
energy that will contribute to carbon dioxide emission reductions.  
CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions 
 
Policy networks have a profound influence on climate change policy outcomes; 
the cases of Canada and Germany have demonstrated this influence. By analyzing 
policy networks within the climate policy community through an institutional framework, 
political economic context, societal forces, and by examining the ideas and discourses 
around climate change, this paper has provided an explanation for Canada’s lack of 
action on climate change policy, and has examined Germany’s progressive action.  
Institutional Framework  
 
The key area in which Canada and Germany differ in terms of their climate 
change policies, is with respect to constitutional authority over the environment, and 
therefore climate change. In both countries, the constitution sets out the jurisdictional 
rights of the federal and sub-national governments. Neither the German or Canadian 
constitution explicitly sets out jurisdiction over the environment, the Canadian 
constitution provides jurisdiction over natural resources to its provinces, which means 
they have jurisdiction over energy policy and as a result have assumed authority over 
environmental matters as well. In Germany, environmental-related competencies are 
found under the concurrent section of the constitution, and therefore it is a shared 
responsibility between the federal and sub-national government, however, the federal 
government takes leadership and sets out the policies for the sub-national governments 
to administer, reducing ambiguity. This is an important difference between the two 
countries, because constitutional authority over the environment at the federal level in 
Germany has played an important role in ensuring coordinated climate policy in the 
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country. Whereas in Canada the various leadership roles on climate policy on the part of 
the provinces has led to an uncoordinated, fragmented policy for the country. 
Jurisdictional ambiguity in Canada has hindered the federal government’s ability to act 
accordingly and has created a situation of federal competitiveness between the two 
levels of government (Skogsatd and Kopas, 1993). The federal government in Canada 
can however exercise authority over environmental concerns since it is not explicitly 
assigned to the provinces, but the country has rarely ever exercised its political powers 
in the area due to provincial resistance. In this sense, the federal government in Canada 
has tried to maintain a level of cooperation with the provinces by playing a limited role on 
climate policy matters.   
The institutional framework has an important role to play when considering the 
success of a country’s climate change policy. In Germany, the governance structure of 
proportional representation has provided a positive political arena for fostering action on 
climate change and keeping it on the political agenda. With the help of coalition 
governments representing a wide range of interests at both sides of the political scale, 
governments have little choice but to work together. This form of cooperation has helped 
to keep climate change on the table in leading coalitions. In Canada, on the other hand, 
the political system operates on a first past the post system. This system allows for one 
party to hold majority in government which, is not usually representative of the 
population, and it is easy for environmental issues such as climate change to get left 
behind. For example, during the years of the majority conservative government in 2011, 
Canada took a big step backwards in terms of climate policy, as it was not a priority for 
this regime, evident by a lack of climate policy initiatives on the political agenda.  
The institutions that are put in place either help to foster climate policy or can 
deter it. From an early time, Germany has been supportive of introducing institutions that 
were used to help educate, inform and move forward on climate policy. For example, the 
 75 
Enquette Commissions, the Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, the climate change program, and the intergovernmental working groups 
have helped to foster cooperation and coordination of climate policy. Institutions such as 
the Commission set up by the government, show the willingness of governments to 
consider scientific knowledge and provide a credible basis for government to base their 
decisions on as well as a means to educate the public. Within the federal government in 
Germany, the climate change competency is given to the Ministry of the Environment 
and they hold the main role in coordination of climate policies between other relevant 
ministries. Canada, on the other hand, has been less effective in providing a basis for 
coordination between ministries, and has largely left it to provinces to move forward on 
climate initiatives. Although, after the recent election Prime Minister Trudeau has 
mandated the lead on climate change to the Ministry of Environment and Climate 
Change, and expects the Minister of Environment to work closely with Natural 
Resources Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to develop a national 
climate plan. Although, at this stage it is not clear how the Minister will coordinate 
between the ministries.  
The institutional framework within a country can provide a basis for the climate 
policy community to either be able to implement effective climate policies or to hinder 
progress. The climate policy community in Germany has enjoyed success on moving 
forward on climate change policy, which institutional structures such as working groups 
and coalition governments have helped to foster. Canada has enjoyed much less 
success on this front, as institutions have not been able to have the same influence on 
government officials. Jurisdictional ambiguity has created a policy community in which 
actors, particularly the federal and provincial levels of government, compete against one 
another for jurisdictional authority, and at the same time, try to find a basis for 
cooperation, specifically in the interest of economic factors. Therefore, where Germany 
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has operated on a basis of cooperative federalism, Canada has displayed competitive 
federalism resulting in a lack of a coordinated climate policy.  
Political Economic Context  
 
Looking at the policy networks through a political economic context is essential to 
understanding climate change policy. Actors which are close to the policy process tend 
to have the most influence over climate policy. In Canada, economic/productive interests 
have enjoyed access to the climate policy process, due to the high reliance on natural 
resources for the economy. The state has a history of putting the economy ahead of the 
environment in Canada and therefore business interests have always been favoured 
over the public and environmental groups. Provinces have a close relationship with 
industries within their jurisdictions to ensure their provincial economies do not suffer. In 
Germany, industry interests have less influence on the policy process and therefore do 
not influence climate policy to the same extent. Where industry does attempt to influence 
government to reduce regulation standards, strong coalition governments who have a 
history of acting on climate change are not easily influenced and, the European Union is 
able to veto any weakening of regulations on the part of the national government.  
Whereas Germany has been a known leader in acting on climate change, and 
setting progressive targets at the international stage, Canada has tended to set quite 
modest reduction targets, largely due to the high integration of the Canadian economy 
with that of the United States, and the Conservative government’s decision to focus on 
oil as the country’s main wealth generation. Canada has generally kept its climate 
change policy initiatives in line with the United States; in fact, keeping in line with the US 
has been a Canadian federal government policy objective. Following in the footsteps of 
US climate change policy, Canada also withdrew from its Kyoto Protocol obligations in 
2011. As Canada’s largest trading partner, any climate and energy policy choices in the 
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US will have major economic implications for Canada. This has led Canada to take a 
largely voluntary approach to climate change action. On the other hand, in Germany, 
although once reliant on imports of oil for energy, after the oil crises of the 70s, Germany 
has taken measures to become more energy independent. This led to the creation of 
renewable energy policies to spark innovation in this new and emerging sector.  
In Canada, differences exist between the economies of the provinces in terms of 
energy use. Some provinces are very low emitters of GHGs while others rely on 
conventional sources of energy and are therefore high emitters. Because the cost of 
reducing emissions varies between provinces, coordination of a national climate policy 
has been a challenge. Add to this the fact that the federal government has historically 
left it up to the provinces to coordinate on climate policy, with no formal mechanisms to 
do so. In Germany, however climate change policy is imposed on the sub-national 
governments by the federal government. Therefore, although there are differing 
economies in various Lander, the federal government uses financial mechanisms to 
allow for a more equal distribution of costs. The situation in Canada, since the 
new Liberal government has come into power in 2015, seems that it has improved in 
terms of the national government stepping in to provide mechanisms for which the 
provinces can coordinate effective climate policies, such as the Pan Canadian 
Framework on Climate Change. This is meant to be a national plan, which involves all 
relevant parities (the first minsters, and related ministries of the federal, provincial and 
territorial levels). Whether this will be an effective approach for the decentralized nature 
of Canada, is yet to be seen.  
Societal Forces  
 
An analysis of the societal actors involved in the climate policy community has 
shown that environmental NGOs in Canada do not appear to have had the same effect 
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as that had in Germany. Although, nonprofit environmental organizations have played an 
important role in informing the general public about the issues of climate change and 
policy in both countries, it was in Germany, that these groups were able to have a voice 
within the federal government. Germany’s NGOs were able to receive such access and 
acknowledgement, directly as a result of the success of the Green Party and its strength 
in the political arena. Environmental groups in Germany are well accepted by 
governments. In Canada under the Harper regime, these groups were threatened with 
audits, specifically towards groups that spoke out and critiqued the government’s 
economic strategy and decision to expand the oil sands. These audits threatened to cut 
funding to those groups that were involved in political activities. The investigations into 
environmental groups restricted the ability of these groups to continue their meaningful 
work, as funding was subject to uncertainties. This action shows an unwillingness of the 
governments decisions to be evaluated. In Germany there is a different culture regarding 
environmental groups, and their work is generally accepted. In fact, they have been quite 
influential in the political arena in pushing for climate action.  
Media outlets also play an important role in spreading awareness of climate 
change issues. Environmental groups use such outlets to spread their message. With 
minimal resources, they heavily rely on media outlets to spur collective action, as has 
been the case in both Germany and Canada. In addition to advocacy groups, scientists 
and research groups often turn to media outlets, to spread high profile and interesting 
findings that should inform public policy. Media outlets in Germany, particularly the 
political magazine Der Spiegel has played a key role in communicating the science of 
the climate change issue, which has helped to inform the general public. In Canada, 
there was a setback in terms of communicating science via media outlets, when the 
Harper regime, discouraged government scientists from speaking with the media.  
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It appears that in both countries the opinion of the public is that climate change is 
a generally accepted and acknowledged issue, and that the federal government should 
take action. The action of the federal government in Germany reflects public opinion, 
likely due to the fact that climate change is a concern for citizens. Therefore politically it 
makes sense to take action. In Canada, the actions of the federal government do not 
reflect public opinion, but the actions of individual provinces do. In addition to federal 
government action, Canadians felt the provinces were to bear responsibility as well, and 
they supported actions taken by their provincial governments on the matter. There were 
some discrepancies however, when it came to acknowledging climate change as an 
issue between provinces. As one would assume, oil-producing provinces such as 
Alberta and Saskatchewan showed a lower percentage of those who believed climate 
change to be occurring. High attention and climate issues tends to motivate political 
actions, therefore years of inaction on the part of the federal government in Canada, 
may have played a part in the success of the Liberal majority government in 2015. The 
Liberal party made climate a top priority during the election period, and is continuing to 
work on the issue at the federal level in consultation with the provinces, and in line with 
public support for taking action.  
Ideas and Discourses 
 
In Canada there has tended to be a long-standing debate over the environment 
versus the economy, particularly under the Harper regime. In Germany the ideas and 
discourses have primarily focused on the precautionary principle and the polluter pays 
concept. This is made clear by the fact that in the past, during leadership under the 
Harper government, any attempt to introduce a national carbon pricing scheme and 
recommendations of implementing a national carbon tax, have been repeatedly shut 
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down. On the other hand, in Germany national carbon pricing schemes have generally 
been accepted and used as a foundation for climate change policy.  
Although ideas about climate change have set Canada back in terms of a 
national climate change policy, we may begin to see a shift with the Trudeau 
government that came into power in 2015. Already we have seen the discourses 
beginning to shift, most notably the symbolic change in name of the federal ministry of 
Environment Canada, to Environment and Climate Change Canada, signaling that this 
government will take the issue seriously. Since Trudeau has been in power, he has 
changed the communication policies, so that government scientists are free to speak 
with media outlets themselves. He has been briefed on the science of climate change 
and has re-initiated the meeting of the first ministers to discuss plans for a national 
climate change strategy: the Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change. These are 
long overdue steps taken by the Canadian government, regardless of the results they 
bring, it is clear that there has been an ideological shift since the Harper regime.  
 Overall, the interests of various actors and their relations with one another within 
the policy community influences the policy process. The institutional, political economic, 
societal, and ideational context has exemplified this for Germany and Canada. Non-
economic actors in Germany have displayed great success in gaining access to the 
policy cycle in relation to climate policy. They have used media outlets, have managed 
to organize themselves effectively, and have developed close relationships with state 
officials fostered by the institutional context. This relationship has had a positive effect 
on climate policy in Germany and is a key reason for the progressive nature of action on 
climate change policy in this country. On the other hand, the economic payers within 
Canada have held a policy monopoly for a long time. Due to the heavy reliance on 
natural resources for the economy, industry groups in Canada have had a profound 
influence on state officials. This has been fostered by the jurisdictional ambiguity of the 
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provinces and the state, and has resulted in an incremental approach to policy making.    
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